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MEGAFIRMS
RANDALL S. THOMAS,* STEWART J.SCHWAB*
& ROBERT G. HANSEN"*

This Article documents and explains the amazing growth of the largest
firms in law, accounting, and investment banking. Scholars to date
have used various supply-side theories to explain this growth, and have
generally examined only one industry at a time.
This Article
emphasizes a demand-side explanation of firm growth and shows how
the explanation is similarfor firms in all "project" industries. Legal
regulation also plays an important role in determining industry
structure. Among the areas covered in this Article are the growth of
MultidisciplinaryPracticefirms (MDPs). MDP growth can best be
understood by looking more broadly at the demand forces driving
project industries. This Article also applies its framework to the
breakup of the Big Five accountingfirms, to the consolidation trend in
the investment banking industry, and to the divergent growth patterns
of the law firms in the plaintiffs' securities litigationfield.
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INTRODUCTION

Big, bigger, biggest. Corporate law firms have exploded in size in
the last two decades. So have accounting firms and investment banks.
Many are now mammoth entities with thousands of employees,
billions in revenues, and offices throughout the world. In the past, a
team of firms, through more or less formal syndication, was likely to
share an especially large project. Today a single behemoth often
handles the task by itself.
Why have megafirms developed in these industries (which we
will call "project" industries because of their particular
characteristics)? Most scholars emphasize one or another "supplyside" story.1 Firm size increases as firms leverage the power of key
partners, or create a name brand of high quality, or run internal
tournaments to motivate recruits. The limits on growth arise largely
from internal organization costs, as it becomes increasingly unwieldy
to govern ever-larger firms.
The supply-side is only half the story, however. Client demand
for larger projects has stimulated firms to grow, too. In this Article,
we show that these megafirms arise at least partially in response to
the increased client demand for bigger projects. In order to make our
argument, we develop a demand-side model of firm structure for
these industries.2
Our theory is based on an economic model of industrial structure

1. See generally Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Sharing Among the Human
Capitalists: An Economic Inquiry into the Corporate Law Firm and How Partners Split
Profits, 37 STAN. L. REV. 313 (1985) (exploring "portfolio theory" as a basic supply-side
explanation of why lawyers band together in firms); David B. Wilkins & Mitu Gulati,
Reconceiving the Tournament of Lawyers: Tracking, Seeding, and Information Control in
the InternalLabor Markets of Elite Law Firms,84 VA. L. REV. 1581 (1998) (employing the
"tournament theory" as a supply-side explanation of the growth of law firms).
2. Despite earlier calls to develop demand-side explanations of firm growth, see, e.g.,
Richard H. Sander & E. Douglass Williams, A Little Theorizing About the Big Law Firm:
Galanter,Palay, and the Economics of Growth, 17 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 391 (1992), we

believe we are the first legal scholars to offer any demand-based theory.
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and syndication in project-oriented service industries. 3 Project
industries include investment banking, law, accounting (both auditing
and business consulting), construction, advertising, and filmmaking,
among others, although this Article concentrates on the first three.
Unlike the standard manufacturing industry of industrial-organization
theory, the key fact of a project industry is that demand is lumpy, or
equivalently, that the products are heterogeneous. Projects vary
enormously in both their size and in the mix of inputs needed to
complete them. For example, law firm projects might range from
defending a sexual harassment suit involving a single employee to
ensuring world-wide compliance of a company's sexual harassment
policies with the laws of numerous countries.
In project industries, firms must choose their market niche.
Gearing up to handle the largest jobs makes one less efficient at
handling smaller jobs. As a result, firms in project industries vary
dramatically in size, input resource mix, legal form, and project
capabilities.
Even the largest firms, however, may find it too costly to handle
the largest projects themselves. Syndication is always an alternative.
Indeed, it is often more efficient for a syndicate of firms to handle
especially large projects. Syndication, whereby two or more firms
combine resources to complete a job, is a common feature of project
industries.
A key element of the project-industry model is the firm's choice
between syndication and internal growth. A project can be handled
by a single firm, assuming the firm is large enough to perform the
necessary work, or by forming a syndicate of smaller firms. Part of
this choice depends on the supply-side-balancing the costs of
coordinating the members of the syndicate versus the costs of
coordinating the members of a larger firm. If a securities firm wants
to bid on an equity offering that is bigger than it can presently handle,
it could gear up to handle the job itself by hiring more investment
bankers, thereby incurring internal organization costs. Alternatively,
it could choose to form a syndicate with other firms to handle the
distribution of the stock, incurring syndication costs. Over time, firms
will consider the relative costs of these two alternatives, in relation to
revenues, in making decisions about their future size.

3. The formal economic model is developed in Robert G. Hansen, Stewart J.
Schwab, & Randall S. Thomas, Structure, Competition and Pricing in Project-Oriented
Service Industries (unpublished Working Paper, Amos Tuck School of Business) (on file
with authors).
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The demand side affects the decision to grow or syndicate. Will
many large jobs exist, or only a few? A firm is more likely to choose
to expand internally (rather than to syndicate) if it forecasts that
clients will demand enough projects of sufficient size to warrant fees
to cover its additional internal organization costs. For instance, if the
nationally based ABC law firm predicts that its clients will prefer to
buy all of their international work from one firm rather than dividing
the work into smaller segments on a national basis, then the firm will
have an incentive to expand globally to handle the work by itself,
even if it has to hire attorneys in other countries to do so.
Finally, firms cannot make this size choice in isolation because
they are affected by what other firms are doing. Syndication requires
partners. If other firms grow, they are less likely to form syndicates.
To continue the law firm example, the ABC law firm will want to
know whether its competitors are going to expand. If its competitors
are growing, this will have at least two effects on ABC: first, its
competitors will be more likely to secure big jobs to the exclusion of
ABC; and second, ABC will have fewer potential syndicate partners
with which to compete for big jobs because the other firms will be
large enough to handle them in-house. So, ABC should be expected
to consider its competitors' decisions to grow internally, or merge
with one another, in making its own decision about expansion.
This Article argues that the demand for large jobs has grown in
the last twenty years, so that the balance between syndication and
large individual firms has shifted. Demand has grown because of new
information technologies and increasing globalization, which allow
corporate clients to grow in size and scope.4 Additionally (although
we advance this more tentatively), corporate clients increasingly want
one-stop shopping for projects. In response, a few leading firms have
chosen to grow, internally or through mergers, to exploit this shift in
client demand for large projects. These firms have decided that it
would be more profitable to take these bigger jobs in-house rather
than to use traditional methods of syndicating the work amongst
several firms.
Examples of this expansion are rife in the law, accounting, and
investment banking. Thus, in the year 2000 alone, such law firm
luminaries as Pillsbury Madison & Sutro; Winthrop, Stimson, Putnam

4. See, e.g., Michael Orey, Two Law Firms Set to Announce Plan to Merge, WALL ST.
J., July 17, 2001, at B2 (noting that the globalization of business has caused law firms to
merge and globalize to remain competitive).
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& Roberts;5 Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker;6 Squire, Sanders &
Dempsey,7 and others s have been involved in mergers, while other
megafirms have aggressively grown internally. Mergers have the
advantage of bringing new clients to the firm but the disadvantage of
potentially creating both conflicts of interest and internal dissension
as the two firms struggle to integrate themselves.
Legal rules are a critical determinant in the ebb and flow of
megafirms. Some legal rules restrain internal growth and favor
syndication. A clear example are the ethical and legal restrictions on
the world-wide efforts of firms to combine law and accounting into
Multidisciplinary Practices (MDPs). Recent legal requirements for
auditing independence are also causing dramatic cutbacks in the
accounting megafirms. 9 Other rules, however, favor megafirms. Two
newsworthy examples are the regulation of securities fraud cases
under the 1995 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (the
5. Id. ("Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro, [sic] based in San Francisco, and Winthrop,
Stimson, Putnam & Roberts, based in New York, expect to announce today their intent to
unite their practices. The merger would create a firm with 820 lawyers in 17 offices.").
Throughout this Article we face the thorny issue of the correct punctuation of firm names,
particularly the absence or presence of commas, blanks, and ampersands. In general, law
firms have been good at observing formal rules such as the serial comma, including GPO
Style Manual Rule 8.58's exception of ommitting the comma before an ampersand.
However, we observe an emerging trend of deleting commas, and a lesser but noticeable
trend of deleting the ampersand. Davis Polk & Wardwell has for years omitted the
comma (although it keeps the ampersand, unlike the British firm Titmuss Sainder
Dechert). Labeling the firm "Davis Polk & Wardwell" sends a subtle but powerful signal
that someone is not "in the know" (analogous to not following bluebooking rules).
Foreign firms seem less likely to use commas or ampersands, although no universal
practice abroad exists either. For example, the London firm Slaughter and May rejects the
ampersand in favor of the word "and."
Although unpacking this post-modern
development arguably takes us beyond the scope of this Article, we theorize possible
causes to lie in brandmarking of firms or in conforming to electronic grammar. Support
for the brandmarking theory comes from the fact that accounting firms did this long ago,
for example Price Waterhouse. But the future may link to e-commerce. Several financial
and accounting firms have gone the no-space route, and even to internal capitalization.
For example, the official websites name PaineWebber and PricewaterhouseCoopers. See
infra note 113. We have tried our best to be accurate on firm names, generally by
checking their websites, but make no guarantee in this fast-moving area.
6. Id. ("Last month, the 103-year-old New York firm Battle Fowler closed shop
when 118 of its attorneys joined Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker ... ").
7. Id. ("Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, based in Cleveland, swallowed most of the
attorneys in San Francisco-based Graham & James to produce a 675-lawyer firm.").
8. Additionally, as recent as this year, the legal industry witnessed another megamerger of two large law firms: that of Chicago-based Sidley & Austin and New Yorkbased Brown & Wood. Law Firms Sidley Austin and Brown & Wood Merge, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 24,2001, at A6. They combined to form Sidley, Austin, Brown & Wood, a Chicagobased firm with approximately 1,325 lawyers, and an annual revenue of about $700
million. Id.
9. See infra notes 150-62 and accompanying text.
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"Reform Act" or "PSLRA") ° and judges' use of auctions" of the
lead counsel positions in some securities fraud cases. An unintended
consequence of these reforms appears to be the creation of one
megafirm that dominates plaintiffs' litigation in the securities field.
The causal influence of legal rules goes both ways, however. Not
only do legal rules influence the trade-offs between syndication and
internal size, but firm organization puts pressure on legal rules as
well. For instance, the Big Five accounting firms' international clients
are now asking those firms to handle both their accounting and legal
matters. 2 In many European countries, these firms are permitted to
do so, potentially resulting in substantial savings for their clients and
benefits to the accounting firms. In the United States, however,
lawyers and accountants have traditionally been prohibited from
practicing together in a firm in which both are principals. American
clients and the Big Five accounting firms have been pressing to
change these rules, but substantial elements of the American bar have
resisted this pressure, claiming that lawyers must maintain their
independence from other service providers to ensure their advice to
clients does not suffer from conflicts of interest. The Security and
Exchange Commission's (SEC) new regulations on auditor
independence are based on a similar conflict-avoidance justification
and will, if enforced vigorously, create a legal barrier to firms that
seek to combine auditing and consulting services. 3 Indeed, an
interesting question is whether the American Bar Association (ABA)
or the SEC is more likely to give way to economic pressures-that is,
whether the ABA's hostility to lawyer-accountant mixing is less
vulnerable than the SEC's hostility to auditing-consulting mixing.
This depends on the degree of purported market failure in these two
areas, 14and the degree to which regulatory intervention improves
things.
This Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, we develop our
model of the factors that affect a firm's choice between internal
expansion and syndication. Part II examines how law firms have
expanded rapidly both domestically and internationally over the past
10. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 15 U.S.C.).
11. For a discussion of judicial auctions as a regulatory mechanism for security fraud
actions, see infra notes 295-98 and accompanying text.
12. Margaret A. Jacobs, Accounting Firms Covet Forbidden Fruit: Piece of U.S. Legal
Market,WALL ST. J., May 31, 2000, at B1.
13. See infra notes 209-12 and accompanying text.
14. These are among the questions we explore in this Article. See infra notes 231-33
and accompanying text.
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few decades. We predict continued increasing levels of merger
activity between U.S. and foreign firms resulting from the race to
develop global firms.
Part III examines the accounting industry, where the dominance
of large firms is even more pronounced. We explain the growth of
the Big Five as resulting largely from the demand by clients for large,
multi-task projects. However, the recent emergence of consolidators,
who are legally prohibited from auditing, demonstrates a new form of
syndication between financial corporations and captive CPA
partnerships. Additionally, the recent split of auditing and consulting
services within Big Five accounting firms hearkens a return to a
syndication model, at least for projects involving substantial elements
of auditing. Finally, Part III also examines new developments in the
multidisciplinary practice of accounting and law, in which firms are
sometimes forced into a syndication relationship when they might
prefer internal consolidation.
Part IV turns to investment banking firms and the public offering
of securities. Syndication has historically played an especially
prominent role in this industry, although the last few years have seen
a decline in its importance. Our model, with its emphasis on client
demand as a driving force behind the choice between syndication and
internal growth, can explain the rise and fall of syndication in
investment banking. We begin with a discussion of the traditional
securities underwriting syndicate, and then examine the impact on
underwriting syndicates of the globalization of securities markets and
the SEC's promulgation of Rule 415,15 the shelf registration rule.
Part V applies our model to plaintiff-side law firms in securities
fraud cases. Here, syndication between small firms is the norm, a
result that judicial regulation heavily influences. The industry
structure is changing, however, in response to the recent and still
controversial practice of choosing lead counsel through judicial
auctions, as well as in response to the passage of the 1995 PSLRA.
Our model predicts how these developments will alter the number
and size of law firms in this field. We then conclude with some
general remarks about our analysis.
I. MARKETS, FIRMS, AND SYNDICATES

Economists and lawyers have tried for over fifty years to develop
a robust theory of the firm. Beginning with Ronald Coase,16 law and
15. 17 C.F.R. § 230.415 (2001).
16. Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386,390-94 (1937).

122
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economics scholars have hypothesized, among other things, that firms
are a nexus of contracts, 17 or arise to minimize transaction cost s ,1"or
act as a solution to team production problems. 9 By contrast, virtually
no attention has been paid to syndicates of firms?
Ronald Coase's schema created a dichotomy between the market

and the firm. Markets are costly to use, taking time and effort to find
trading partners, negotiate the price and other terms of the deal, and
enforce the contract. Firms are created, as Coase sees it, to avoid
these market transaction costs. Instead of many market contracts
between various factors, a single contract (e.g., offer your labor at a
certain salary to act according to the entrepreneur's instructions)
occurs between the entrepreneur and other factors that comprise the
firm. But firms have costs as well, particularly as they get larger. The
entrepreneur encounters the organizational cost of directing many
people and the related principal-agent problems that arise out of firm
members' tendency to shirk responsibilities under the grand contract
if not monitored closely.
Many scholars, particularly those insisting that the firm is a nexus
of contracts, have attacked Coase for creating a false dichotomy
between market and firm.2' In the firm and market, these scholars
say, all is governed by contractual relations. Other scholars, indeed,
have thrown up their hands and declared that determining what is a
firm, and what is outside the firm, is a boring or irrelevant question.'
It is all a matter of shading of different types of contracts.23
17. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior,Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 310 (1976) (stating
that firms "are simply legal fictions which serve as a nexus for a set of contracting
relationships among individuals").
. 18. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM:
FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING 385-408 (1985).
19. Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and
Economic Organization,62 AM. ECON. REV. 777,794-95 (1972).
20. See Hansen, Schwab & Thomas, supra note 3 (discussing the limited research on
the syndication of firms).
21. E.g., Oliver Hart, An Economist's Perspective on the Theory of the Firm, 89
COLUM. L. REV. 1757, 1761 (1989) (describing Coase's dichotomy between the authority
of the firm and consensual trade in the market as a "conceptual weakness").
22. See Steven N.S. Cheung, The ContractualNature of the Firm, 26 J.L. & ECON. 1, 3
(1983) (arguing that it is unimportant to distinguish between firm and market
transactions); Benjamin Klein, Contracting Costs and Residual Claims: The Separation of
Ownership and Control,26 J.L. & ECON. 367, 373 (1983) ("Economists now recognize that
such a sharp distinction [between intrafirm and interfirm transactions] does not exist and
that it is useful to consider also transactions occurring within the firm as representing
market (contractual) relationships. The question what is the essential characteristic of a
firm now appears to be unimportant.").
23. See Victor P. Goldberg, Regulation and Administered Contracts, 7 BELL J. ECON.
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Our model recognizes that there are many intermediate hybrids
between firm and market. In particular, we emphasize the syndicate.
A syndicate is created when admittedly distinct firms agree by
contract, or less formally, to coordinate services on a particular
project. Syndicates arise because, at any point in time, a firm may be
too small, too busy at the moment, or otherwise lacks the resources to
effectively handle the jobs that are available. The firm could expand
to handle this work internally, but expansion is costly-particularly
when the project seems of exceptional size, and when the firms'
managers cannot predict with sufficient confidence whether there will
be other large projects forthcoming. If the firm guesses wrong, the
firm has incurred long-term internal organizational costs to complete
a short-term project. An alternative to incurring long-term costs is to
work with another firm on a temporary basis to complete a particular
job. Syndicates are common in certain industries, such as the sale of
securities for public companies, private venture capital financing for
companies, or the representation of clients in complex transactions or
litigation.
The distinctive feature of project-oriented service industries is
that the product varies from transaction to transaction, and is both
discrete and heterogeneous. For example, one of the major services
provided by investment banks is the issuance and distribution of
securities. This process involves significant amounts of advisory
work, and the marketing and distribution of the instruments being
sold. Each issuance is unique in the resources required, for example,
to distribute the securities. Some issues will be large, others small.
Some issues will be sold to institutional investors, while others will be
primarily marketed to individuals. Thus, the resources needed for
each issuance, such as the brokers and salespeople, will need to be
tailored to the particular offering.
The heterogeneous product means that no single firm structure is
optimal in supplying all products. The point sounds obvious, but it
distinguishes these markets from traditional manufacturing industries.
Consider the widget-manufacturing industry of traditional industrialorganization theory. If the least-cost method of manufacturing a
widget is with a factory of five-hundred workers producing tenthousand widgets a year, and aggregate demand is for one million
widgets, one would expect a large number of factories each producing
roughly ten-thousand widgets with five-hundred workers. Larger or
426, 426-27 (1976) (emphasizing similarities between long-term contracting between firms
and coordination of activities within the firm).
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smaller firms and firms with different mixes of capital and labor
would, by assumption, be less competitive. In project industries, by
contrast, not every project is alike. Projects that are large in scale and
scope are made most efficiently by one type of "factory" (say, one
that employs accountants and lawyers from several countries) while
smaller projects are more efficiently made by other factories (say, one
that employs only bankruptcy lawyers).
Importantly, shifts in demand affect project industries more
profoundly than other industries. To continue our example, suppose
the overall demand for widgets increases from one million to two
million. We would not expect individual firms to grow, because this
would make them less efficient. Rather, one would expect more firms
(or more divisions of existing firms) to spring up, but the new
enterprises would still employ five-hundred workers and produce tenthousand widgets, to remain competitive with the existing enterprises.
Contrast that with a shift in demand in a project industry, so that
demand for large projects doubles but the demand for small projects
remains constant. One would expect more large firms but not more
small firms.
As relative demand for large projects increases, each firm in the
project industry must decide whether and how to respond. One
possibility is to increase its internal size or scope. Alternatively, it can
join a syndicate of smaller firms, incurring syndicate costs rather than
internal organization costs. The decision between internal growth
and syndication depends on their relative costs as well as whether the
shift in demand is seen as permanent or transitory. Internal growth is
increasingly expensive in our model. A firm's internal organization
costs increased at an increasing rate in both scale (i.e., the overall size
of the firm) and scope (i.e., the number of different inputs, such as tax
lawyers, bankruptcy lawyers, and litigators). Diseconomies of scale
arise because it becomes more difficult to manage the larger numbers
of workers and other inputs needed for bigger projects.
Diseconomies of scope occur because it is easier to manage an
organization of homogeneous inputs. For example, an investment
bank with only a small retail sales force is easier to manage than a
bank with large retail and institutional sales forces. While improved
information technologies may have expanded the efficient size of the
firm by, for example, allowing more productive workers to use the
same computer systems and thereby lower per unit costs, at some
point the firm's average cost curves start to slope upward as they
grow bigger.
Importantly, these internal costs are relatively fixed regardless of
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how many projects are completed in a particular time period. Even if
the firm works on only a few projects, it must employ its inputs and
bear organization costs. Thus, it is not worthwhile to be so large as to
serve the largest projects, if they come too infrequently to justify the
higher costs.
Syndication is another way for firms to complete bigger projects
without incurring the high internal organization costs. The potential
for savings through syndication seems clear: since firms must hire
their inputs before knowing the actual nature of the jobs available in
the next time period, it is likely that they will not be ex-post optimally
Syndication allows flexibility through ex-post restructured.
configuration of firms' structures on a temporary basis z4 Thus, law
firms can syndicate work amongst several firms that offer different
sets of services, either by area of specialization, or geography, or
both32
Syndication has its own problems. Perhaps most obviously,
revenues must be shared with other firms in the syndicate. The lesser
revenues can be justified if the costs decrease, compared to internal
growth. Syndicates are costly to run, however. Managing the
workload between firms is not easy, particularly as projects become
more complex. Agency costs arise as members attempt to free-ride
off the work of other members, and occasionally take away the clients
of another syndicate member.26 This requires monitoring by the lead
firm or the client. The monitoring costs may be very high when a
syndicate has many members.
The equilibrium structure of a project-oriented industry at any
one point in time can be viewed as a balancing of internal firm

24. Cf. Margaret A. Jacobs, Law-Firm Mergers Take a New Turn as Plansfor a 14Way Union Are Set, WALL ST. J., Oct. 27, 1999, at B23 (reporting that several small and
midsize firms have responded to the growth of big firms by forming networks to refer
business and share information, but not to share profits).
25. Syndication may also be necessary where national legal regimes prevent
international law firms from expanding into local markets. For example, until recently,
Japan and Singapore had legal rules that required foreign firms to form joint ventures with
local law firms. SYDNEY M. CONE III, INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN LEGAL SERVICES:
THE REGULATION OF LAWYERS AND FIRMS IN GLOBAL PRACTICE §§ 13.3,16.3 (1996).

Other countries have ethical rules that prevent local lawyers from working as employees
of foreign firms. Still other countries restrict foreigners' practices to a representative
office, advising only on foreign law. For further discussion of the treatment of foreign law
firms by different countries, see id.
26. Clients may often be the ones that decide which firms will belong to the syndicate.
Long standing relationships with certain firms may lead in-house counsel to select a
particular syndicate structure. Presumably, the client carefully considers the costs
associated with syndication when it chooses this form.
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organization costs against external syndication costs. For any given
distribution of jobs, some degree of syndication is more efficient than
having firms capable of doing any kind of project. Placing all of an
industry's input resources into one large firm can cause costs to be
higher than spreading them out over several firms and using
syndication to complete big projects. Larger, more diverse firms
incur diseconomies of scale and scope. Generally, syndication causes
firms to economize on firm organization costs, allowing smaller,
"boutique" firms. In the legal profession, patent law presents a good
example of an area where syndication among firms might be
prevalent. 27
However, firms' optimal structures are highly interdependent, so
that a shock to one firm that causes it to revise its structure will in
turn impact the other firms' optimal structure. These shocks may
arise from many sources, but we focus on three different types of
changes: a shift in the size of the job, changes in other firms' sizes or
cost structures, and alterations in the existing legal regime. For
example, if jobs become larger over time as a result of clients' needs,
then an accounting firm may choose to expand to handle each job
internally. The larger organization costs it incurs from employing
more inputs may be more than offset by the increase in revenues from
being able to staff the job in-house, especially if the larger accounting
firm will gain more clients after its expansion.
The existence of syndication makes equilibrium industry
structure even more sensitive to external shocks. A shock that has
the direct effect of reducing syndication opportunities will have a
secondary effect as well: as the firms move to restructure themselves,
the opportunities for mutually beneficial syndication can be further
reduced. For instance, the first accounting firm to expand will have
an advantage in seeking to land the bigger jobs being offered by
clients, but this expansion will also have several secondary effects.
The newly expanded firm will now be less interested in engaging in
syndicates with the other firms. The other firms may believe that the
expanded firm is earning more profit by itself on bigger jobs than they
are in syndicates. All of these factors may lead the remaining
(smaller) firms to seek to grow larger, either internally or through
27. Although patent law firms have been consolidating in recent years, patent
prosecution is still an area that remains attractive as a specialty area for a boutique firm.
Well-known firms such as Fish & Neave (New York), Pennie & Edmonds (New York),
Fish & Richardson (Washington, D.C.), Merchant & Gould (Minneapolis), and Finnegan,
Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner (Washington, D.C.), are just a few of the
independent specialty patent firms.
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mergers. Firms that choose not to expand may pay a price. For
example, one of the best known international investment banks, J.P.
Morgan, had been left on the sidelines in the lucrative underwriting
and merger-advisory business because of its relatively small size and
refusal to merge with its rivals. 28 It was eventually acquired by Chase
Manhattan Bank. 29
Our key empirical assertion is that, in the last twenty years,
clients have increasingly demanded large projects." This increased
demand has shifted the historical equilibrium between syndication
and internal size, and has triggered internal growth by service
providers. The increased demand for large projects comes from
increased globalization of clients and the explosion in information
technology. In addition, and in part to exploit more fully the
efficiencies of the new technology, clients increasingly want one-stop
shopping.
In some industries-accounting and law are good examplesclients traditionally asked firms to provide them with a limited set of
services on a local basis. Over the past thirty years, clients have
shifted toward asking firms to provide them with more and more
services on a broader and broader geographic basis. For example,
globalization has led many clients to ask firms to handle increasingly
complex transactions across international borders.3 1 Changes in
information technology have reduced the costs of internal growth and
contributed to this trend toward larger firms by breaking down
communication, time, computing and other barriers that previously
constrained the size and scope of transactions.32 Clients can therefore
ask service firms to handle increasingly complex deals. In the face of
these changes, firms are increasingly choosing growth over
syndication.3 3
28. See Jathon Sapsford, J.P. Morgan May Be Value Play It Aims to Match Street
Rivals, WALL ST. J., Aug. 17,2000, at C1.
29. See Randall Smith & Charles Gasparino, Merger Question on the Street is 'Who's
Left?', WALL ST. J., Sept. 13,2000, at C1.
30. This empirical assertion is frustratingly hard to document. See infra notes 65-67
and accompanying text.
31. Patrick E. Mears & Carol M. Sanchez, Going Global: How Do Law Firms Do It
and What Does It Change?,Bus. L. TODAY, Mar./Apr. 2001, at 32,32-34.
32. For example, with technology only recently available, Morgan Lewis & Bokius
LLP, one of the ten largest law firms in the world, utilizes a high-capacity, private email
system to connect its approximately 2,500 lawyers and staff in twelve offices across the
globe to collaborate with each other and to communicate with clients around the clock.
Stanley M. Wasylyk, Keeping Your Attorneys in Touch at All Times, LEGAL TECH
NEWSL., Dec. 2000, at 5.
33. We emphasize that this is only a trend and that there are many firms which have
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We see an increased demand by clients for one-stop shopping "
for their legal, investment banking, and other professional services'
needs, triggering industry-wide consolidations.35
The financial
services industry is a recent example of this process. Smaller firms,
such as boutique investment banking firms, lack the necessary capital
and scale to compete with larger ones, such as full service banks, to
meet the demands of big international clients.3 6 Thus, in the recent

initial public offering (IPO) of Agere Systems Inc., which is being
spun off by parent Lucent Technologies, the company selected its
underwriters based on whether they were willing to lend Lucent and

Agere substantial amounts of money as part of the $6.5 billion Lucent
restructuring. 37 Only commercial banks that had acquired Wall Street
investment banks had strong enough balance sheets to lend Lucent

the hundreds of millions of dollars that it demanded as the price of
participation in the IPO underwriting. This one-stop shopping led to
the exclusion of pure investment banking firms such as Goldman
Sachs Group Inc. and others."
The result was a tremendous amount of merger activity within
that industry, as independent firms have rushed to achieve greater
scale. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, J.P. Morgan, PaineWebber, and
not pursued growth strategies for a wide variety of reasons. On the international side,
some types of jobs may be more suitable for one firm to handle rather than for a syndicate.
For example, asset securitizations in Europe may involve a dozen different jurisdictions,
but are usually handled by one law firm (usually Clifford Chance). But with other types of
deals with only two or three different jurisdictions, where the investment bankers have
good local connections with local law firms, the transaction costs of syndication may be
much lower and the job may be handled by a group of firms.
34. To the best of our knowledge, no one has yet documented the increase in demand
for one-stop shopping empirically. In Part II.B, we attempt to do so on a preliminary basis
for the demand for legal services in the mergers and acquisitions area. We believe that
more work needs to be done to quantify this shift. However, the forces that have led
many clients to demand such services are well-known: increased quality of work product,
increased efficiency in provision of services, and decreased costs. John S. Dzienkowski &
Robert J. Peroni, MultidisciplinaryPracticeand the American Legal Profession: A Market
Approach to Regulating the Delivery of Legal Services in the Twenty-First Century, 69
FORDHAM L. REV. 83, 117-27 (2000); Tia Breakley, Note, Multidisciplinary Practices:
Lawyers and Accountants Under One Roof?, 2000 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 275, 297-301.
For further discussion of this point, see infra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
35. For example, in the legal profession, multinational clients have welcomed onestop shopping because they are "able to reduce substantially the number of the law firms
they were dealing with, bringing about better matter management, better quality, lower
legal fees, and lower overhead costs to manage their panel of outside law firms." Marc J.
Bartel, The U.S. Impact From Europe'sLegal Scene, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 14, 1998, at 5.
36. Smith & Gasparino, supra note 29.
37. Suzanne McGee, Lucent Rewarded Lenders With UnderwriterRoles, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 28,2001, at C1.
38. Id.
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Wasserstein Perella all were acquired by other banks, and Lehman
Brothers and Bear Stearns are reported to be under pressure to join
forces with financial services giants. 9
Clients, especially
multinational companies, are looking for larger firms. They want to
engage in one-stop shopping to get the best deals from service
40
providers.
In sum, as we document in the subsequent parts of this Article, in
law, accounting, and investment banking, syndication strategies have
been largely eclipsed by internal growth strategies. In other words,
growth and more growth are what we see today at the larger firms.
The reasons behind the decline of syndication and emphasis on
growth are explained by changing client demand and changes in
internal organization costs. Syndication has been used historically in
a variety of situations that include: (1) where additional size is
needed within the same discipline for particular projects and
syndication is cheaper than growth because of cost differentials (e.g.,
investment banking); (2) where more than one discipline is needed
for a project, as with firms combining auditing and consulting or law
and accounting; and (3) where more than one country, culture, or
regulatory system is involved, perhaps best illustrated by the
international expansion of American and U.K. law firms. As we
discuss in Parts II, III, and IV, all three of these justifications have
been undercut by changes in the underlying demand for these firms'
services and lower costs of internal growth.
However, some limitations to these trends are emerging.
Internal organization costs can reach such high levels that even highly
profitable firms find it better to split up into smaller entities and
engage in syndication. We find this to be a likely explanation for the
disintegration of the Big Five accounting firms that have been
offering both auditing and consulting services. These smaller firms
may be aggressive competitors against large firms if they can form
networks to share information and business with one another.
Legal rules can also constrain growth. For instance, the legal
profession's self-regulatory rules, at least nominally-and perhaps
effectively-bar the creation of multidisciplinary law firms. We claim
that the firms' desire to grow to meet client demands will create
powerful forces in favor of changes to these rules. If clients are
39. Smith & Gasparino, supra note 29; Wasserstein's Acquisition Completed by
Dresdner, VALL ST. J., Jan. 5, 2001, at C16.
40. Investment bankers have been pushing the one-stop shopping concept for many
years. Bartel, supra note 35, at 5.
41. Jacobs, supra note 24.
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demanding that accounting firms continue to expand to provide
broader ranges of services, including legal services, our analysis leads
us to predict that these rules will come under increasing pressure to
change.
Conflicts rules are another powerful constraint on firm growth.
Large law firms have suffered from legal rules on conflicts of interest
for years that have prevented them from being on both sides of a
transaction.42 With the upswing in merger activity among firms, and
their increased size, these rules have forced firms to abandon former
clients and turn down potentially lucrative business, despite ingenious
solutions that some firms have devised, such as advance waivers of
conflicts.43 Powerful pressures have emerged to change these rules
though, and the ABA has recently proposed a substantial relaxation
of them.'
Conversely, if a new legal rule is instituted that increases the
relative costs of syndication versus internal expansion, firms will
expand internally. The shelf registration rule45 has had this effect in
investment banking, as we will show in Part IV.
Furthermore, just as demand for professional services can
increase, it can also decline. If clients stop engaging in mergers and
acquisitions activity, for example, then demand for legal services for
these deals will drop. While law firms may be willing to carry
underutilized attorneys for quite a while, at some point we would
expect to see downsizings at law firms (and other service providers)
to bring firm size in line with these demands.4 6 One need only read
the recent daily papers on a casual basis to see stories of such
retrenchments throughout the industries discussed in this paper.47
42. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2001).
43. Richard B. Schmitt, Law-Firm Mergers Create Conflict Problems-And Ingenious
Solutions, WALL ST. J., June 7, 2001, at B1. These rules, in a somewhat different form,
also affect accounting firms and constrain their offering clients certain types of other
services. See Part III for further discussion.
44. See, e.g., ABA Report of the Commission on Evaluation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct, at xiv-xvi (2000) (summarizing proposed changes).
45. Securities Act of 1933 Regulation C-Registration General Requirements, 17
C.F.R. § 230.415 (2001) (promulgating rule permitting shelf registration).
46. There is increasing evidence that this is happening in the high tech law firms, as
they engage in cost-cutting layoffs of marginal workers. See, e.g., Ann Grimes, Silicon
Valley Law Firms Retrench as Deals, Stock PortfoliosDwindle, WALL ST. J., June 15,2001,
at B1.
47. See, e.g., David Marcus, Fenwick & West Dismisses 32 Attorneys, THE DAILY
DEAL, Sept. 6, 2001, available at http://www.thedeal.comlcgi-binlgx.cgilAppLogic
+FTContentServer?pagename=FutureTenseApps/XcelerateRender&c=TDDArticle&ci
d=TDD8006CARC (last visited Nov. 15, 2001) (documenting Fenwick & West's recent
struggles as well as charting recent layoffs at many other Silicon Valley firms) (on file with
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Finally, we should note that for any given probability distribution
of jobs, some firms will compete for the largest jobs, some for the
smallest jobs, and others for the ones in the middle of the distribution.
Client demand for services may be segmented by job size or by the
service offered. We would expect that different types of firms will
compete within each of these markets. For example, the demand for
lawyers to handle criminal defense cases (with the possible exception
of large white-collar crime cases) is likely to be quite different from
the demand for legal services in mergers and acquisitions, and we
would expect different types of firms to compete for those jobs.4 8
Smaller firms may be more efficient for smaller jobs.
We are primarily interested in firms that compete for the very
largest jobs, which tend to be the megafirms that are the focus of the
rest of the paper. We argue that for these firms, a shift in client
demand toward bigger projects, or one-stop shopping, will push them
toward expanding firm size, or to engage in syndication, in order to
meet client expectations. In the next three parts, we look at how
these different industries have reacted to shifts in client demand
toward increased job size.

II. THE GROWTH OF LARGE LAW FIRMS
Our project-industry model fits law firms well, since law firms
work in a project-oriented industry. Generally, private-practice
attorneys work on legal issues for clients in discrete matters. These
projects differ dramatically in size. They may also differ along other
dimensions, such as whether they involve domestic law or
international issues, whether they involve the law and regulations of
one jurisdiction or many, or whether they involve only one area of
law or many. Complex deals frequently require firms to provide a
broad variety of services. For example, a merger of two large
the North Carolina Law Review); David Marcus, Silicon Valley Law Firm Ditches
Attorneys, THE DAILY DEAL, Oct. 12, 2001, available at http://wvw.thedeal.com/cgibin/gx.cgi/AppLogic+FTContentServer?
Pagename=FutureTense/Apps/Xcelerate/Render&c=TDDArticle&cid=TDDCDF5OPSC
(last visited Nov. 15, 2001) (noting that Gunderson Dettmer was especially affected by the
recent downswing in the economy because it "specializes in corporate, securities and
technology work [and] has no litigation or bankruptcy [practice]"). While law firms have
so far resisted layoff, "now that the downturn has finally come, the 'L' word is being
whispered again in hallways and conference rooms [of law firms], and associates nervously
await pink slips." Cameron Stracher, Manager'sJournal: Let the Lawyer Layoffs Begin,
WALL ST. J., May 14, 2001, at A18.
4S. Much work remains to be done to improve our understanding of the different
types of firm structure that have evolved in response to demand and supply-side factors in
these different markets. This is a fruitful area for further research.
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multinational companies may require lawyers from several different

countries with expertise in securities law, tax law, environmental law,
employment law, and antitrust law.
Law firms come in all shapes and sizes. As table 1 shows, the
biggest American firms today employ over a thousand attorneys and
have offices spanning the globe. At the other extreme, the solo
practitioner continues to thrive in many parts of the country. In
between these two extremes, firms cover the spectrum.
TABLE 1: Largest U.S. Law Firms
(Ranked by Revenue)
Firm Name

HQ

Revenue
(Millions)

Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher
& Flom

New York

$1,025

292

1,322

2.

Baker & McKenzie

Chicago

818

558

2,477

3.

Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue

Cleveland

595

274

1,213

4.

Latham & Watkins

Los Angeles

582

280

900

5.

Shearman & Sterling

New York

491

163

752

Rank

Equity Partners

Lawyers

6.

Sullivan & Cromwell

New York

474

119

476

7.

Mayer, Brown & Platt

Chicago

464

306

816

8.

Davis Polk & Wardwell

New York

460

130

515

9.

Sidley & Austin

Chicago

446

260

827

10.

McDermott, Will & Emery

Chicago

445

244

7S4

11.

Weil, Gotshal & Manges

New York

440

160

660

12.

Simpson Thacher & Bartlett

New York

434

128

503

13.

Morgan Lewis

Philadelphia

430

290

948

14.

Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher

Los Angeles

418

219

640

15.

Cleary, Gottlieb,
Hamilton Steen &

New York

412

141

525

16.

Kirkland & Ellis

Chicago

410

118

599

17.

White & Case

New York

405

183

847

18.

O'Melveny & Myers

Los Angeles

373

213

692

19.

Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer &
Feld

Dallas

360

217

834

20.

Cravath, Swaine & Moore

New York

350

83

363

Source: AM. LAW., July 2000

The internal structure of law firms also shows a wide variety.
Most firms have traditionally had two classes of attorneys: partners
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that hold equity stakes, and associates that are employees at will. In
recent years, the differentiations amongst attorneys have become
more refined. It is now common to see larger firms employing two
classes of partners, equity and non-equity, and multiple variations
within each class. In addition, associates are often broken into
different classes, such as special counsel, traditional associates, and
contract hires. Many other attorney classifications may also exist.
Law firms typically employ a number of other components of
production, or in economists' terms, inputs. These may include
greater or lesser numbers of professional managers (who may not be
attorneys), paralegals, support staff, and other administrators.
Firms differ in their organizational forms, too. Whereas all firms
were once organized as partnerships, today a host of other business
entity forms are commonly used. These include the traditional
partnership, Limited Liability Companies (LLCs), Limited Liability
Partnerships (LLPs), and Professional Corporations (PCs). The
attraction of the new entities is that they supposedly permit the equity
partners to insulate themselves from some of the personal legal
liabilities associated with the partnership form of organization.
Perhaps most dramatically, the size of the largest law firms has
exploded in the past two decades, as shown in table 2. Historically,
most law firms were domestically oriented and offered a limited set of
services; local clients made limited demands on firms. Firms tended
to specialize in one practice area, and called in other firms to handle
cases or transactions that required several different specialties.
A.

Supply-Side Explanationsof Law Firm Growth
Legal scholars have offered several explanations for the
spectacular growth of law firms. Most of these explanations focus on
the needs of law firms in profitably offering quality legal services, or
what we call a "supply-side" explanation.
Portfolio theory provides a basic supply-side explanation of why
lawyers band together in firms. As explained in a path-breaking
article by Gilson and Mnookin,4 9 individual lawyers cannot diversify

their human capital. By combining individual specialties within firms,
law partners can eliminate the unsystematic risk of specialties, just as
an investor can eliminate unsystematic risk with a portfolio of
investments.

49. Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 1, at 321-30.
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TABLE 2: Selected Major U.S. Law Firms Growth (1983-1999)
1983
Firm

°

1999'

Number
Attorneys

Number
Domestic
Offices

Number
Int'l
Offices

Skadden, Arps, Slate,
Meagher & Flom

275

3

---

Shearman & Sterling

340

1

Davis Polk & Wardwell

251

Sullivan & Cromwell

Number
Attorneys
(approx.)

Number
Domestic
Offices

Number
Int'l
Offices

1,300

8

11

4

700

3

10

1

2

500

1

4

218

1

2

450

2

6

Baker & McKenzie

622

3

24

2,450

9

501

Sidley & Austin

308

3

Jones, Day, Reavis &
Pogue

301

4

Vinson & Elkins

318

2

Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher

278

6

Latham & Watkins

183

4

6

850

4

4

1,200

10

I0

1

550

4

4

4

650

10

3

950

9

5

--

--

1983 data are taken from the AMERICAN LAWYER GUIDE TO LEADING LAW FIRis 1983-84.
1999 data are taken from LAW FIRMS YELLOW BOOK, Summer 1999.
Not including one correspondent law firm and one affiliated consulting firm.
Not including one foreign affiliated law firm.

Tournament theory has become the dominant explanation of the

growth of law firms, again from the supply side.50 In an influential
study,5 1 Galanter and Palay document the exponential growth of large
law firms. Their explanation has two parts. First, experienced
lawyers have more client work than they can personally handle (a
phenomenon they later label "Big Client Trust"). 52 They therefore
hire associates to leverage their own human capital. But second, the
experienced lawyers must monitor and motivate the associates, which
50. See the opening sentence of Wilkins & Gulati, supra note 1, at 1581
("Tournament theory has become the dominant academic model for analyzing the
institutional structure of large law firms.").
51. MARC S. GALANTER & THOMAS M. PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW FIRM 77-120 (1991); Marc S. Galanter & Thomas
M. Palay, Why the Big Get Bigger: The Promotion-to-PartnerTournament and the Growth
of Large Law Firms, 76 VA. L. REV. 747,755-56 (1990).
52. Marc S. Galanter & Thomas M. Palay, A Little JoustingAbout the Big Law Firm
Tournament, 84 VA. L. REV. 1683, 1684 (1998) ("[T]he sine qua non of the large law
firm... is the trust of the client (or clients) who can furnish more work than a single lawyer
can possibly do.... Let's call it Big Client Trust or BCT.").
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they do by running a promotion-to-partnership tournament. As long
as firms keep a constant percentage of tournament winners (the
associates who get the prize of partner), and a constant partner-toassociate ratio, the mathematical result is exponential growth.
Tournament theory has its critics. For example, Wilkins and
Gulati note that the tournament is not a meritocracy like a tennis
tournament, but more like a multi-round skating event where
multiple factors determine the winners. 3 They would add signaling
theory and relational capital stories to provide a richer model of the
internal labor market of law firms.54 Their more contextualized
model explains why law firms develop training and paperwork tracks
for associates and why some associates have presumptions in their
favor (are seeded in the tournament). But Wilkins and Gulati's rich
story remains a supply-side one, focusing on the needs of law firms to
produce the product rather than responding to client demands.5
Rutherglen and Kordana would go further and abandon
tournament theory altogether as the key element of the modern law
firm.56 The leveraging of partners' human capital and the competition
between firms for associates are sufficient. Intriguingly for our
demand-side perspective, Rutherglen and Kordana note that
tournament theory "does not address the increased demand for the
services of large law firms, which must have accompanied their
increase in size. '57 Finally, they say, tournament theory does not
explain the recent trend toward increasing law firm size by hiring
partners laterally or, even more dramatically, by merging entire firms.
In all these supply-side theories, a firm's growth is limited by the
agency costs associated with governing a large group of people.
Large, integrated law firms incur greater internal organization costs
than smaller specialty firms. These costs arise in part from the greater
number of inputs employed by the big firms, including the attorneys
and other workers, as well as the bigger offices and higher resulting
overhead costs. These entities are also harder to manage, so that
more attorney time is eaten up handling firm management questions,
and professional managers may need to be hired.
Internal organizational costs should increase with the size of the
53. Wilkins & Gulati, supra note 1, at 1677.
54. Id. at 1589-90,1656-57.
55. Id. at 1587-91.
56. George Rutherglen & Kevin A. Kordana, A Farewell to Tournaments? The Need
for an Alternative Explanation of Law Firm Structure and Growth, 84 VA. L. REV. 1695,
1705 (1998) ("[W]e now must go beyond tournament theory....").
57. Id. at 1703.
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firm (scale) and also with the mix of inputs that it uses (scope). For
example, a small specialty firm that has only one practice area,
perhaps tax or patent law, should be easier to manage than a larger
firm that offers its clients a full range of legal services. The larger
firm's size and diversity of legal specialties make it more difficult to
manage effectively.
Our model accepts these supply-side explanations, without the
need to referee which model or combination of models best explains
the internal structure between partners and associates of law firms.
Rather, our goal is to explain the overall size of law firms, and in
particular the spectacular growth of the largest firms and the limits on
that growth. From the supply-side models, we emphasize that agency
costs place upper limits on internal size. Even the tournament
champions, Galanter and Palay, recognize that growth has its limits,
and that the internal agency costs of coordinating the players must at
some point outweigh the value of continuing the tournament." Our
perspective emphasizes that the varying size of legal projects-a
demand-side explanation-is a critical factor in the size of law firms.
A law firm wanting to service exceptionally large projects always has
an alternative to expensive internal growth, which is relying on a
network or syndicate of firms to handle the exceptionally large
projects.
B.

Demand-Side Explanationsfor Law Firm Growth

The demand for legal projects is a key element in determining
the optimal size of a law firmi 9 A firm wants to be large enough to
capture a steady stream of large projects, but does not necessarily
want to be large enough to handle the largest projects, particularly if
58. The image that comes to mind with an exponentially expanding firm is a Ponzi
scheme, where one does not want to be the frustrated associates holding the bag when the
bubble bursts. Cf. Cunningham v. Brown, 265 U.S. 1, 7 (1924) (describing the
"remarkable criminal financial career of Charles Ponzi," giving rise to bankruptcy
litigation reaching the U.S. Supreme Court); Stephen A. O'Connell & Stephen P. Zeldes,
Ponzi Games, 3 NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF MONEY & FINANCE 147, 147 (1994)
(describing how Ponzi operated "a financial chain letter, using funds from new investors to
pay off earlier investors").
59. In examining how the legal profession restricts strategic litigation through ethical
rules, Professor Gilson has likewise distinguished supply-side from demand-side stories
and recognized the paucity of demand-side explanations of legal practice. See Ronald J.
Gilson, The Devolution of the Legal Profession: A Demand Side Perspective, 49 MD. L.
REV. 869, 916 (1990) ("The study of professionalism by lawyers and sociologists has been
dominated by a myopic, albeit understandable, focus on the supply side of the traditional
market for legal services."). Professor Gilson does not use the demand-side perspective to
explain law firm growth, however.
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they arise infrequently. Rather than incur the long-term fixed costs of
size, a better strategy might be to share the work of exceptionally
large projects with other firms, in some form of syndicate. As clients
change their demand for legal projects, the optimal balance between
syndication and internal growth changes as well.
The future demand for legal projects is uncertain. Cases arise
depending upon financial and economic variables, government action,
and filing of suits by individuals. At best, firms can only project the
probability distribution for the jobs that will arise in the future. The
boom and bust mergers and acquisitions cycle of the 1980s and 1990s
is a good example of the changing probability distribution of legal
projects. For most of the 1980s, law firms were expanding their
mergers and acquisitions practices as rapidly as they could to handle
seemingly endless demand for their services. However, in the late
1980s and early 1990s, merger activity dropped off and significant
retrenchment took place in these departments at many law firms, with
lawyers being reassigned or even dismissed. Not until client demand
picked up again later in the decade did law firms respond by once
again expanding their mergers departments to staff many big deals.
The bust phase of the cycle reappeared in 2001.60
Syndication works well for short-run boom and bust cycles.61
Syndication permits law firms to share work amongst each other in
response to the demand for large projects, without incurring longterm costs of growth.
One form of syndication has smaller,
specialized law firms working together (or with larger firms) for
clients who need advice on several aspects of their business.
Syndication is also common for complex business deals, especially for
international transactions. For example, international mergers are
60. Many attorney layoffs witnessed in 2001 at some large law firms were "in capital
markets or mergers and acquisitions departments, [therefore] reflecting the reality that
deal flow ... quickly [dried] up." Sandra Rubin, Sober Times at the Bar: A Cloud of
Doom Hovers Over PracticesAcross North America as Hefty Salary Increases and Bonuses
Get a Second Look and Firms Position Themselves to Counter Declining Revenue, NAT'L
POST, Nov. 7,2001, availableat 2001 WL 29558801 ("The New York law firm of Shearman
& Sterling decided recently to cut up to 10% of its associates, becoming one of the first
tier-one transactional firms to acknowledge it has been significantly affected by cutbacks
by its larger corporate clients.").
61. We note that syndication with other firms is not the only possible response to
sudden changes in demand. Firms appear to be increasingly using contract associates and
temporary attorneys to handle certain types of cases. The expansion of this type of hiring
would blur the traditional boundaries of law firms and give the firm another alternative to
internal growth or expansion. However, if there has been an increased use of contract
associates and temporary attorneys, it has not stopped the rapid expansion of megafirms.
For example, we continue to see large numbers of mergers and acquisitions among these
firms.
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often handled by several law firms from different countries serving
the same client on a coordinated basis.
When demand for large-scale projects shifts, however, the
calculus between syndication and growth also changes. When large
projects are episodic, it is inefficient for a single firm to incur the
internal growth costs required to handle one by itself. The risk that
resources will remain idle, or have to be laid off, is large. But when
large projects become more routine, it is more cost effective to grow
internally. As a leading firm or two grows to service the large
projects, the remaining firms have fewer opportunities to syndicate.
They are then forced to respond by internal growth themselves,
rather than relying on syndication.
Indeed, firms do not always wait for actual demand to shift, but
may also respond to anticipated demand. For example, the law firms
White & Case and Clifford Chance have opened offices in countries
where there is presently little client demand, but where they
anticipate such demand will arise in the future.62 This demand may
not materialize, in which case these firms may need to reduce or
eliminate their investments. This is consistent with our model's
predictions that firms will change their employment levels if their
internal organization costs are not covered in equilibrium.
Our basic demand-side explanation for law firm growth is the
explosive increase in the demand for large, complex projects. As one
well-known commentator noted recently: "Increased regulation of
the economy..., a robust economy, and an unprecedented increase
in the number and size of both domestic and international
transactions, and a comparable increase in the volume and scope of
litigation have all increased the demand for, and the resulting supply
of, lawyers."'63 As business corporations have grown in size and
geographical scope, they demand larger legal projects, and law firms
respond to this increased demand by growth and merger.' 4
Of course, not all clients started generating such projects. Many
large corporations continue to select a top-tier law firm in each
country-irrespective of size-to handle their particular problems in
62. Wade Lambert, Doing Business In Vietnam Has Pitfalls, WALL ST. J., Feb. 11,
1994, at B5 ("U.S. law firms see a rising demand for their own services in Vietnam."); see
also Konstantin Richter, Singapore Eases Access for Lawyers from U.S., U.K., WALL ST.
J., Aug. 11, 2000, at A12; Vietnam to Award 6 Foreign Law Firms Branch Licenses, WALL
ST. J., May 13, 1996, at B5.
63. Daniel R. Fischel, MultidisciplinaryPractice,55 BuS. LAW. 951, 969-70 (2000).
64. Mears & Sanchez, supra note 31, at 32 (explaining that the globalization of
business has led to "a sea change" in the legal industry).
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that nation. Nevertheless, the probability distribution of demand
shifted toward larger jobs because more clients started making these
demands. Demand changes at the margin can have a large influence
on a law firm's structure as they compete for additional business, even
while trying to serve existing clients in traditional ways.
Client demand for legal services is not an easily observed
variable. While clients and firms often cite the need for one-stop
shopping in discussing the future of legal service providers, we are
forced to infer facts about actual demand from other data. Mergers
and acquisitions is perhaps the best illustration of the shift in client
demand. Increased law firm job size can be inferred from data on the
growth in the number, value, and size of mergers and acquisitions.
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the number of proposed mergers in the
United States and their value from 1990-2000. These figures are
based on filings made by companies seeking clearance from federal
regulatory authorities for potential antitrust violations. They show a
clear upward trend in both the number, value, and size of the
proposed mergers. The average value per proposed transaction also
rose substantially over this time period from $134 million in 1990 to
$413.2 million in 1999.65
Turning next to table 3, we see that similar trends exist for
completed mergers during the period 1980 through 1999. There is a
clear upward trend in the number of transactions, their value, and the
average value per deal. There also appears to be a large upswing in
the number of big deals valued at more than one billion dollars.
From these data showing more mergers with bigger dollar values, we
infer an increased demand for bigger projects and that larger teams of
attorneys will be needed by the firms that handle them. This
inference is supported by anecdotal evidence of client demand for
these services.66
We do not claim that these data constitute an ideal measure of
increased client demand for bigger jobs.67 There are several flaws in
it. For example, it may be the case at some firms that each deal is
staffed by the same number of lawyers irrespective of its size, so

65. The average values for each year in figures 1 and 2 are: 1990, $134 million; 1991,
$103 million; 1992, $108 million; 1993, $142.8 million; 1994, $166.4 million; 1995, $191.8
million; 1996, $229.6 million; 1997, $280 million; 1998, $359.8 million; 1999, $413.2 million.
66. See, e.g., Bartel, supra note 35.
67. An ideal measure could be constructed through a microlevel study of each
individual firm to sort out the individual contributions of supply-side factors and demandside factors. This suggests an important area of future research for legal and sociological
study.
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bigger valued deals may not increase demand for legal services.
Another problem is that deal value may also be increasing because of
changes in stock prices resulting from general market increases
during this time period. So it might be true that deals are no bigger
today than they were ten years ago once market conditions are taken
into account.
Figure 1: Number of Proposed Mergers in United States (1990-2000)
Hart-Scott-Rodino Premerger Filings*
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required, such as those subject to approval by federal regulatory agencies.
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Figure 2: Value of Proposed Mergers in the United States (1990-2000)
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Undoubtedly, these factors will need to be taken into account
before client demand for legal services can be accurately measured on
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a disaggregated basis. However, we believe these data suggest an
upward trend in job size that is also consistent with clients' statements
that they are interested in one-stop shopping and that is consistent
with the increased globalization in the mergers and acquisitions area
that we discuss below.
TABLE 3: Completed Mergers (1980-1999)
Year

Number
of Deals

Value of Deals
(millions)
(when reported)*

Number of
Deals with
Price Data

Average
Value per
Dealt

N/A
N/A
$34,829.9
1,558
1980
N/A
N/A
69,524.4
2,328
1981
N/A
N/A
60,697.8
2,298
1982
51.02
1,017
51,890.9
2,339
1983
84.84
1,476
125,228.8
1984
3,064
1,620
89.06
144,283.5
3,397
1985
103.78
1,970
204,438.9
4,323
1986
92.92
1,907
177,203.3
3,920
1987
1,904
124.17
4,001
236,424.3
1988
1,930
127.17
3,766
245,431.0
1989
156.77
1,048
164,293.3
3,154
1990
131.84
1,073
3,446
141,460.5
1991
93.13
1,340
124,787.7
3,678
1992
109.13
1,561
170,349.8
4,042
1993
148.12
1,893
280,400.0
1994
4,923
2,383
157.36
375,000.0
6,209
1995
227.01
2,892
656,500.0
7,077
1996
229.43
3,449
7,834
791,300.0
1997
4,263
314.99
10,092
1,342,800.0
1998
406.03
3,433
1,393,900.0
8,695
1999
Value data are not reported for all transactions.
t Calculated using data on mergers where data on price were reported.
Source: MERGERS & ACQUISMONS: DEALMAKER'S J. (various issues).

Number of
Billion ($)
Dollar Deals
N/A
9
10
6
19
26
31
30
42
35
37
21
17
29
44
75
101
136
185
N/A

Bigger jobs can also demand a broad array of services from
firms. A larger law firm not only can offer clients more attorneys, but
also a broader variety of services. It provides clients not only
specialized legal advice, document preparation, and litigation
services, but also helps them prepare proposed administrative
regulations, draft legislation, or perform lobbying services. It can
operate on a local, national, or international scale. Today, large
American law firms "have developed the capacity to analyze and

compare different and competing legal orders, and develop strategies
through which their clients can benefit from the legal diversity and
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complexity inherent in a federal system of law."6
Rapidly changing information technology is also creating
pressure to expand law firms. Smaller firms are disadvantaged in the
competition to attract clients by the substantial up-front expenses
associated with continually updating their information technology
services to compete with the bigger firms, then having to spread their
higher costs over a smaller client base.69 This creates pressure to
expand, or merge with a competitor, in order to lower these costs and
increase the number of matters so that the technology can pay for
itself.
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom (Skadden, Arps)
provides an interesting illustration of law firm growth and
development. Initially a very small firm, it grew rapidly as its leader,
Joseph Flom, became well-known in the corporate takeover field in
the 1970s.7 ° By the time that mergers and acquisitions activity
mushroomed in the 1980s, Skadden, Arps was established as one of
the top firms in the area. It used this position to leverage itself into
many other related practice areas and quickly grew until it reached its
current position as one of the largest firms in the world with a
diversified portfolio of practice areas spread throughout the world.7 1
While some of Skadden, Arps's growth came through associate-topartner promotions, as tournament theory would suggest, much of it
did not. Rather, it involved acquisitions of groups of lateral partners
in new practice areas who would bring clients with them.
Skadden, Arps's development from a firm that largely handled
mergers and acquisition work, leaving clients to look elsewhere to
meet their other needs, into a diversified megafirm providing onestop shopping for clients, can be explained using our model. While it
initially operated with other firms in syndicates, offering clients only
mergers and acquisitions advice, over time Skadden, Arps reacted to
client demand for more services by first expanding into more
68. David M. Trubek et al., Global Restructuring and the Law: Studies of
Internationalizationof Legal Fields and the Creation of TransnationalArenas, 44 CASE W.
RES. L. REv. 407,423-24 (1994).
69. Mark Pruner, The Internet andthe Practiceof Law, 19 PACE L. REV. 69, 88 (1998).
70. LINCOLN CAPLAN, SKADDEN:

POWER, MONEY, AND THE RISE OF A LEGAL

EMPIRE 82 (1993); John E. Morris, Takeover Artist,AM. LAW., Dec. 1999, at 61 ("With his
perennial foil, Martin Lipton of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, Flom defined the
takeover field and saw it through to its climax in the 1980s.").
71. Morris, supra note 70, at 61 ("By 1978 the firm [Skadden, Arps] had grown to 160
lawyers, with two-thirds of its revenue from the M&A practice. Without foresight,
Skadden, Arps might have remained an M&A boutique. But in the 1980s Flom shrewdly
leveraged that franchise into a full-service operation.").
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domestic practice areas, and then internationally to open offices in
other countries.72 In short, Skadden, Arps stopped using syndication
as a method of obtaining additional inputs in favor of a growth
strategy in response to client demand that it provide a broader set of

services.7
Just as Skadden, Arps grew to take advantage of the client
demand for integrated services outside the mergers and acquisitions
area, many other rival large law firms acted (or reacted) in the same
way. As shown in table 1, law firms have increased their size and the
number of their offices to handle these mega-transactions. For big
clients, and big cases, firms need resources and a diversified portfolio
in order to have the necessary staying power to handle these
transactions.74 Bigger firms with diverse practices get a larger share
of the market. Table 2 shows the rapid growth in size of some of the
largest U.S. law firms from 1983 to 1999.
Law firms need not rely on internal growth to respond to the
demand for larger projects. While internal growth might work, it is
often more efficient to grow by mergers with other firms or by
acquiring selected parts of other firms to fill the expanding firm's
needs in certain practice areas. Mergers of law firms in different cities
or countries are particularly effective in expanding a law firm's
geographical reach. 5 While supply-side explanations of law firm
72. On the international front, Skadden, Arps has used some syndicate-like
relationships with existing firms to offer one-stop shopping. For example, Skadden, Arps
recently announced a joint venture with Chiomenti Studio Legale, one of Italy's leading
firms, its "largest and most significant cross-border alliance." Steve Lipin, Deals & Deal
Makers-Italy Suits Skadden: Law Firm Will Now Join With Chiomeni-Big New York
Concern Expects LargerEuropean Presence With PreservedAutonomy, WALL ST. J., June
12, 2001, at C12. As Skadden, Arp's European managing partner stated after the
announcement, "Each firm [is] ...desirous of preserving its own culture. But what we're
trying to do is market ourselves as a seamless one-stop for investment transactions into
and out of Italy." Id.
73. We do not claim that our model provides the only possible explanation for these
changes. Supply-side factors may also explain some of the reasons for Skadden, Arp's
decision. For example, the need to diversify practice areas can also be viewed through
diversification models as a method of responding to the firm's partners' risk aversion.
74. Diane Goldner, Six Branch Offices that Compete with New York's Top Tier;
Latham Watkins, MANHATTAN LAw., Jan. 19-25, 1988, at 14. In just three years Latham
has become one of the most profitable firms (measured in revenue per lawyer) in New
York. The firm has accomplished this by diversifying the types of projects it handles. Id.
("In the branch's first year of operation, 60 percent of its work was M&A related. By 1987
the amount of M&A work had dropped to 50 percent ....The New York lawyers plan to
diversify their practice.").
75. Fischel, supra note 63, at 970 (explaining that client demand for larger law firms
with broad geographic coverage and reduced costs of communication have led to growth
of law firms); Schmitt, supra note 43 ("Law firms see mergers as a means to improve client
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growth are embarrassed by the recent merger activity of firms,
mergers become a natural way of responding to a shift in the
probability distribution for future large jobs.76
The trend toward mergers and geographic breadth is escalating
in the rapidly consolidating legal industry. In 2000, a new firm,
Pillsbury Winthrop, was created from the merger of San Francisco's
Pillsbury Madison & Sutro with New York's Winthrop, Stimson,
Putnam & Roberts.77 In deals of similar nationwide scope, over one
hundred attorneys from New York's Battle Fowler joined Los
Angeles's Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker, and Cleveland's Squire,
Sanders & Dempsey swallowed San Francisco's Graham & James.78
This growth was driven by the demand side, as global clients wanted a
single law firm that could service all of their needs.79 As Nick Unkovi
of Graham & James explained: "Our clients are more and more
demanding one-stop shopping," and it was therefore "important for
us to ally ourselves with a partner who would greatly expand our
geographic coverage and size."

0

Of course, not every elite corporate-law firm has expanded.
Wachtell Lipton's decision to remain a relatively small, specialized
mergers and acquisitions firm provides an interesting contrast to the
Skadden, Arps approach.
Wachtell Lipton appears to have
consciously chosen to pursue a syndication strategy rather than to
grow dramatically. Assuming that Wachtell Lipton faced the same
set of client demands as Skadden, Arps, it may have believed that the
costs of growth exceed those associated with a syndication strategy.
In other words, supply-side models would explain Wachtell Lipton's
choice as one of maximizing per partner profits by staying small. One
important factor in the success of Wachtell Lipton's decision may be
its dominant market position as the premier defense firm in the
mergers and acquisitions business which ensured it would continue to
obtain excellent clients. Its highly specialized practice may allow it to
charge premium prices that will more than cover its higher costs of
providing services, such as information technology, to its clients.
service, by expanding their practices and geographic reach.").
76. Cf Fischel, supra note 63, at 970 (stating that increased demand for legal services
has led law firms to expand rapidly).
77. See Michael Orey, Two Law Firms Set to Announce Plan to Merge, WALL ST. J.,
July 17,2000, at B2.
78. Id.
79. Id. John Pritchard, chairman of Winthrop Stimson, emphasized that global forces
drove his firm's recent expansions: "Our clients are globalizing, our competition is
globalizing." Id.
80. Id.
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International legal practice has seen an even more dramatic story
of law firm growth in response to an increased demand for large legal
projects."1 Here the growth versus syndication story we tell contrasts
strategies of opening new offices overseas and merging with foreign
firms (growth) as a way of satisfying client demand for cross-national
legal services with the use of formal and informal arrangements of
U.S. and foreign law firms to handle international transactions
(syndication). Again, we see that the growth strategy has led to the
creation of international megafirms, although some strong name
brand firms continue to be very successful using syndication.
Historically, each country had its own set of legal rules and
regulations and attorneys practiced solely in their own country. Many
nations restricted cross-national lawyers and some restricted
international law firms.82 Domestic firms used formal or informal
syndicates with law firms in other countries to cover the international
needs of their clients, such as, cross-border transactions.
The creation of the European Community, the opening of
national borders between member countries, and the resultant growth
in the number of businesses that operate in many countries within
Europe has radically expanded the demand for large legal projects in
Europe since the 1 9 8 0s.3 This shift in the probability distribution of
jobs overwhelmed the old line European law firms, who relied on
syndication to handle large projects.' 4 Instead, three new groups have
81. Paul M. Barrett, Drive to Go Global Spurs Law-Firm Merger Talk, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 18, 1999, at B1 ("Cross-border mergers are roiling practically every industry. Now
the law business may be next ....

American firms ...

are nervous that over the next

decade, radical consolidation in the global law industry will yield a half-dozen
international titans and a lot of also-rans with shrinking profit margins.").
82. See generally CONE, supra note 25 (providing an extensive discussion of these
restrictions); see also generally Harri Ramcharran, Trade Liberalization in Services: An
Analysis of the Obstacles and the Opportunitiesfor Trade Expansion by U.S. Law Firms,
MULTINATIONAL Bus. REV., Apr. 1, 1999, at 27, 31-32 (analyzing the trade barriers faced
by U.S. law firms abroad). Some liberalization of these restrictions has developed. Many
of the most restrictive countries desire to join the World Trade Organization, putting
significant pressure on them to open up their domestic markets to foreign lawyers since
the General Agreement on Trade in Services applies to professional services such as
lawyering. See generally, Laurel S. Terry, GATS' Applicability to Transnational
Lawyering and Its Potential Impact on U.S. State Regulation of Lawyers, 34 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 989 (2001) (examining the effect of GATS on the provision of legal
services). This may explain Singapore's recent decision to permit foreign lawyers to
practice there.
83. See Ramcharran, supra note 82, at 35; Trubek et al., supra note 68, at 426; Carlta
Vitzhum, Mergers Transform Europe'sLaw Firms, WALL ST. J., July 22, 1998, at All.
84. Bartel, supra note 35, at 5 ("Confronted with global clients' demand for
sophisticated services within a specific jurisdiction and with national clients' demand for
global services, Continental European law firms were forced to rethink their strategy ... ).
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stepped into the void to meet clients' needs: American law firms, the
85
Big Five accounting firms, and a new style of European law firm.
American law firms gained a toe-hold in the European market
during the recovery from World War II. Several firms opened, or
expanded, European offices so that by the end of the 1970s, there
were a number of well-established American firms in Europe.86
These firms were in a good position to take advantage of the boom in
demand for legal services that arose from the creation of the unified
European market, the development of financial institutions and
markets in London and elsewhere in Europe, and the wave of
mergers and acquisitions in Europe during the end of the 1980s.
Table 4 lists the foreign offices of the largest American law firms.
The large American law firms could offer European clients onestop shopping for their legal services by assembling groups of
specialists that could handle all aspects of a complex transactionY In
other words, the American firms could take on the new larger jobs
that the existing European firms were too small to handle. These
firms also expanded into other international markets. As table 5
shows, several American law firms, especially Baker & McKenzie and
White & Case, have become major providers of legal services abroad.
Their competitors, the Big Five accounting firms, were
simultaneously growing to meet the new demand for expanded sets of
legal services.8 8 These firms had an established niche in the European
85. Trubek et al., supra note 68, at 426-27; Tom Herman, Ernst & Young Will Finance
Launch of Law Firm in Special Arrangement, WALL ST. J., Nov. 3, 1999, at B10; Jacobs,
supra note 12.
86. Ramcharran, supra note 82, at 31 ("Over the recent years there has been a rapid
expansion abroad of the top U.S. law firms in terms of offices located in different
countries and the number of lawyers employed abroad."); Trubek et al., supra note 68, at
432. Some examples include: Baker & McKenzie, http://www.bakerinfo.com (last visited
Nov. 20, 2001) (opened Paris office in 1963 and London office in 1961) (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review); Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, http://www.jonesday.com (last
visited Nov. 20, 2001) (opened Paris office in 1970) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review); Mayer, Brown & Platt, http://www.mayerbrown.com (last visited Nov. 20, 2001)
(opened London office in 1974) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); Gibson,
Dunn & Crutcher, http://vww.gdclaw.com (last visited Nov. 20,2001) (opened Paris office
in 1967) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); and Sidley Austin Brown & Wood,
http://www.sidley.com (last visited Nov. 20, 2001) (opened London office in 1974) (on file
with the North Carolina Law Review).
87. Bartel, supra note 35, at 5 (explaining that U.S. law firms were able to capture
market share in Europe by offering one-stop shopping for legal services); Trubek et al.,
supra note 68, at 432-33.
88. Bartel, supra note 35, at 5 (stating that accounting firms entered into the
competition to provide legal services in the European market with some substantial
advantages); Herman, supra note 85 ("In other parts of the world, such as Europe, Big
Five accounting firms have set up, affiliated with or acquired law firms, creating massive
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legal market in providing tax advice to businesses there.8 9 As the
market for tax services grew, the accounting firms expanded their tax
capabilities by hiring lawyers from government agencies.90 The
mergers and acquisitions wave of the late 1980s, however, really
triggered the Big Five's capture of a significant share of the market
for legal services in Europe. 91
TABLE 4: Foreign Offices of Largest U.S. Law Firms
Rank

Skadden,
Arps, Slate, Meagher &
Flom
owww.kadden.com

China, Belgium,* Germany,' Hong Kong,*
England, Russia,* France,* Singapore,' Australia,*

U.S. Headquarters: New York

Japan canada
Argentina, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain,
Belgium, Brazil,' Canada, Chile,* China,
Colombia, Czech Republic, Egypt,* France,
Germany, Hungary,* Indonesia,* Italy,* Japan,
Kazakhstan, Mexico, Netherlands,* Philippines,'
Poland, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Spain,

Baker & McKenzie
www.bakerin.ceon
w Hweadqurter
2.
ic o
U.S. Headquarters: Chicago

Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue
www.jonesday.com
U.S. Headquarters: Cleveland
Latham & Watkins
4.
www~lw.comHogKn7
U.S. Headquarters: Los Angeles
Shearman & Sterling
5.
www.shearman.com
U.S. Headquarters: New York
Sullivan & Cromwell
6.
www.sullivan.com
U.S. Headquarters: New York
Mayer, Brown & Platt
7.
www.mayerbrown.com
U.S. Headquarters: Chicago
Davis Polk & Wardwell
8.
www.dpw.com
U.S. Headquarters: New York
Sidley Austin Brown & Wood
9.
www.sidley.com
U.S. Headquarters: Chicago
McDermott, Will & Emery
10.
www.mwe.com
U.S. Headquarters: Chicago
Denotes an affiliate office.
Source: Nov. 2001 Firm Web sites
3.

Locations

Firm

Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Ukraine,
U.K., Venezuela, Vietnam
Belgium, China, Germany, Italy, Switzerland,
Hong Kong, Spain, U.K., France, Singapore,
Australia, Taiwan, Japan
U.K., Germany, France, Russia, Singapore, Japan,
Hong Kong
U.K., France, Germany, Hong Kong, Belgium,
Singapore, Canada, China, Japan, United Arab
Emirates
U.K., France, Hong Kong, Australia, China,
U.pa, Frany

Total
otal
Foreign
It

35

13
7

10

7

Japan, Germany
Germany, U.K., China, Japan,' Mexico,* France

6

U.K., France, Germany, Japan, Hong Kong

5

Hong Kong, U.K., China, Singapore, Japan

5

U.K., Russia, Lithuania
3
(not specified which offices are affiliates, if any)

'multidisciplinary' firms that often dominate their field.").
89. Trubek et al., supra note 68, at 434; Margaret A. Jacobs, Hybrid Law Practicesin
U.S. Debated-Attorneys Weigh Accounting Firms' Desire to Move Into Legal Market,
WALL ST. J. EUROPE, May 31,2000, at 6.
90. Matthew Goldstein, Big Five Court Tax Attorneys: Many Make Leap as
Accounting Firms Work to Expand Their Legal Reach, CRAIN'S N.Y. BUS., Mar. 22, 1999.
91. Trubek et al., supra note 68, at 434-35.
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TABLE 5: Largest International Law Firms Including Legal
Departments of Big Five Accounting Firms
(Ranked by Number of Lawyers)
Rank

2.
3.
4.
5.

Other
u

Offices

Lawers

Firm Name

HQ

Lawyers

Partners

Clifford Chance / Rogers
.Wells / Punder

London

2,518

601

1,917

30

36%

Baker & McKenzie

Chicago

2,423

556

1,876

61

79

London
N/A

1,735
1,718

N/A
NIA

N/A
N/A

N/A
NIA

N/A
NIA

Landwell
(PricewaterhouseCoopers)
Arthur Andersen Legal
Services*
Skadden, Arps, Slate,
Meagher & Flom

Abroad

Los Angeles

1,366

314

1,052

20

10

6.

Jones, Day, Reavis &
Pogue

Cleveland

1,353

417

936

20

11

7.

KPMG*

Paris

1,264

N/A

NIA

NIA

8.

Eversheds

London

1,010

353

657

19

6

9.

Freshfields

London

991

254

757

16

43

10.

Latham & Watkins

Los Angeles

984

322

662

16

4

11.

Linklaters

London

980

230

750

16

27

12.

Morgan Lewis & Bockius

Philadelphia

964

313

651

13

5

13.

Allen & Overy

London

958

225

733

19

41

14.

Mallesons Stephen Jacques

Sydney

922

192

730

7

2

15.

Sidley & Austin

Chicago

872

411

461

10

6

16.

Ernst & Young7

N/A

954

NIA

N/A

N/A

N/A

17.

White & Case

922

215

707

29

46

18.

Holland & Knight

Tampa

859

533

326

19

1

19.

Akin, Gump, Strauss,
Hauer & Feld

Chicago

827

317

510

11

5

20.

Mayer, Brown & Platt

Chicago

827

317

510

11

5

30.

Deloitte & Touche*

N/A

691

NIA

N/A

N/A

Los Angeles

N/A

N/A

Notes: The listing by LawMoney.com may understate the number of lawyers working at Big Five accounting firms.
For example, a May 29, 2000 article by Geanne Rosenberg published in the NationalLaw Journalreported over 3,600
lawyers at Arthur Andersen Legal Services, 3,300 at KPMG - Klegal, 1,500 at Landwell - PWC, and 800 at Deloitte &
Touche. The article did not list a number of lawyers for Ernst & Young.
. Denotes Big Five accounting firm.
Source: http:/Iwww.LawMoney.com July 27, 2000.
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The Big Five had several advantages in meeting client demands
for fuller services in the legal market. 92 They were already providing
clients with full service business planning and strategy on a worldwide
basis. As they recruited big name lawyers, they were able to expand
the range of services that they offered to cover all of their clients'
legal, financial, and consulting needs in complex transactions. 93 This
enabled them to provide clients with a greater spectrum of services on
a more international basis than the law firms with whom they were
competing. As we discuss in Part III.D below, the Big Five firms are
moving to create fully integrated professional service firms, or
Multidisciplinary Practice firms (MDPs), that will directly compete
with other law firms. Table 5 shows that three of the Big Five have
legal departments that rank among the ten largest law firms in the
world, while the other two are not far behind.94
A third player is emerging in the European legal market in
response to the shift in the demand for legal services-the
multinational European law firm with offices all over the continent.
As the U.S. firms and accounting firms made inroads into the old
style European law firms' markets, these firms were forced to rethink
their business strategies.95 New multinational firms have arisen
throughout Europe, particularly through the efforts of aggressive
English firms.96 Some of this growth came through internal expansion
but also a large number of law firm mergers has occurred.97 For
92. Bartel, supra note 35, at 5 (stating that these advantages included their
international reputation and the ability to duplicate "the successful plan and structure of
their audit and consulting practices"); Jacobs, supra note 89 ("European corporate clients
who have used the Big Five's legal services praise the efficiency and cost savings....").
93. Trubek et al., supra note 68, at 434; Jacobs, supra note 89 (explaining that
accounting firms "in Europe explicitly provide a broad array of legal services, including
counseling on such high-end matters as corporate finance and mergers and acquisitions")
94. Cindy Krischer Goodman, One Firm Fits All, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 14, 1999, at
1E ("Already, the Big Five are informally considered to be the world's largest law

firms.").
95. Bartel, supra note 35, at 5 (explaining that as the American law firms and
international accounting firms penetrated the Continental market, "[i]t was not sufficient
any longer to simply be a good national law firm organized around old-fashioned
principles, rules and structures"); Vitzhum, supra note 83 ("Europe's legal profession... is
facing the new reality of a unified European market and globalization.").
96. Trubek et al., supra note 68, at 435-36; Jacobs, supra note 24 ("European firms
have merged to meet competition from large accounting firms that have expanded their
legal services in Europe, where lawyers have been less reluctant to combine with other
businesses."); Vitzhum, supra note 83 ("As barriers to trade have fallen, such foreign
heavyweights such as the law firm Clifford Chance of the United Kingdom have muscled
their way into the Continental market, building up strong teams of Spanish lawyers as part
of broader expansions.").
97. ABA COMM. ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRAC., FINAL REPORT TO THE HOUSE
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example, the English firm Lovell White Durrant merged with the
German firm Boesebeck Droste in January 2000 to form a new firm
with about 1,050 attorneys. 98 Another union is London's Freshfields'
with Germany's Bruckhaus Westrick Heller L6eber to create a law
firm with roughly 2,300 lawyers with twenty-nine offices around the
world.99 These new European law firms have several advantages in
their legal market, such as the ability to easily incorporate European
lawyers into their practices and the European Community regulations
that lower the barriers to cross-border practice for European
nationals.'
Table 5 again shows how these firms have moved into
the ranks of the largest law firms in the world, with the English firms
of Clifford Chance, Eversheds, Freshfields, Linklaters, and Allen &
Overy being particularly strong competitors.
This consolidation trend has spread across the Atlantic in the last
couple of years. In 1999, for example, an American, an English, and a
German firm merged to create a global law firm: Clifford Chance
Rogers & Wells.'
Several other major mergers between American
and international law firms have also taken place. 02 For example,
Coudert Brothers merged twice with law firms from other countries:
once with a Belgian law firm and once with an Australian law firm. 10 3
Christy & Viener, an American law firm, joined together with Salans
Hertzfeld & Heilbronn, a French firm."0 White & Case merged with
a prominent German law firm in July 2000.105 Dechert Price &
10 6
Rhoads merged with an English law firm, Titmuss Sainer Dechert.
OF DELEGATES 16 (July 2000) [hereinafter REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES].

98. Konstantin Richter, Legal Colossus May Be Forged Between U.K., German Firms,
10, 2000, at A25.
99. See Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, at http://www.freshfields.com/firm/en.asp
(last visited Nov. 28, 2001) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
100. Trubek et al., supra note 68, at 436.
101. John E. Morris, The New World Order,AM. LAW., Aug. 1999, at 92 (describing
the three way merger). The merger included Rogers & Wells from the United States,
Clifford Chance from the United Kingdom, and Plinder, Volhard, Weber & Axster from
Germany. Id.
102. COMMISSION ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE, UPDATED BACKGROUND
WALL ST. J., Apr.

AND INFORMATIONAL REPORT AND REQUEST FOR COMMENTS
[hereinafter UPDATED BACKGROUND REPORT].

3 nn.14-15 (2000)

103. Today's News Update,N.Y.L.J., Sept. 28, 1999, at 1.
104. Anna Snider, Paris-New York Merger Breaks New Ground, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 18,
1998, at 1.
105. See 2000 Annual Report, at http://wwv.whitecase.com/annualreport_2000.pdf
(last visited Nov. 21, 2001) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) ("In July 2000,
we joined forces with one of Germany's top M&A firms, Fedderson Lavele Ewerwahn
Scherzberg Finkelburg Clemm.").
106. DechertPrice & Rhoads, British Firm Plan Merger, WALL ST. J., June 26, 2000, at
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Western Europe is experiencing a rash of similar mergers. 10 7
In addition to the expansion of client demand within the
European Union countries, law firms have seen that the fall of the
Iron Curtain and the privatization of former state-owned enterprises
in Eastern Europe have created many new opportunities that
provided them with incentives to open new foreign offices.108
Furthermore, the rapid growth of many Asian economies and China's
increased integration into the world economy have given firms
motives to establish overseas offices in Asian countries. 10 9
Consistent with our theory, the driving force behind these
international mergers is the increased demand by clients for legal
services on a global basis.110 For example, Clifford Chance has stated
that it wants to create one-stop shopping "capable of handling a wide
variety of local, English and American law work for big companies
and financial institutions through its many offices worldwide." '
Probably the single greatest force in this shift has been the increase in
mergers and acquisition activity in the European market.
In other
words, a change in the size of projects expected in the future led to a
change in firm structure. When one firm grew to take advantage of
the potential larger jobs, its competitors felt pressure to follow suit.
While we lack data to test our claim of increased client demand
for one-stop shopping outside of the mergers and acquisitions area,
we see many of the same forces at work for other legal specialties.
Globalization is forcing clients to consider the effects of their
overseas manufacturing activities in a wide variety of countries. For
instance, Nike's decision to manufacture its shoes in developing
countries has forced it to become concerned with the labor laws in
many of those countries as American consumers have protested its
alleged abuses of its workers' rights. Bridgestone's acquisition of
Firestone Tire in the United States has exposed it to products liability
suits it probably could have avoided had it kept all of its
manufacturing facilities in Japan. These clients want law firms that
107. See Richter, supra note 98.
108. Mears & Sanchez, supra note 31, at 33.
109. Id.
110. REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, supra note 97, at 16 (stating that the
mergers are a "reflection of the changes in the global marketplace for legal services and a
response to competition [firms] face from MDPs in countries outside the United States").
111. Mears & Sanchez, supra note 31, at 39 (noting additionally that many firms are
attempting to create a recognizable global brand).
112. Trubek et al., supra note 68, at 437. See generally Bernard S. Black, The First
InternationalMerger Wave (and the Fifth and Last U.S. Wave), 54 U. MIAMI L. REV. 799
(2000) (discussing the international merger wave of the 1990s).
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they know and trust to assist them with their legal disputes. While
they are still often forced to use syndicates of firms to handle their
legal needs, the demand for one-stop shopping seems to be growing.
Before moving on to discuss accounting firms and investment
banks, we should reemphasize that our model focuses on a demandside explanation for the emergence of megafirms. However, it
remains flexible enough to explain both growth and syndication
strategies that result from supply-side considerations. For example,
several "name brand" firms have resisted the trend of rapid
expansion through mergers and acquisitions, preferring to grow more
slowly through internal labor markets, and continuing to use
syndication for overseas jobs. Two outstanding examples of this are
Cravath, Swaine & Moore in the United States and Slaughter and
May in the United Kingdom. Both of these firms have apparently
acted to maximize profits per partner, and therefore strictly limited
the number of their equity partners, even at the expense of total firm
revenues. This may also be true for certain "pure play" firms, such as
Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz (mergers and acquisitions) and
Caplin & Drysdale (tax). These firms may be able to exploit their
specialized knowledge to charge their clients premium prices that
allow them to cover their increased costs of remaining small, such as
those associated with improved information technology. Our model
would explain these firms' decisions to prefer syndication as the result
of the lower net costs of that approach, where net costs take into
consideration improved revenues. Each of these firms can afford to
turn down client demands for one-stop shopping because of their
strong market niche.
We also do not deny the importance of noneconomic factors as
complementary, and sometimes alternative, explanations of law firm
structure. For example, most U.K. firms use seniority systems in
determining partner compensation, whereas many American firms
emphasize partner productivity. These cultural differences may lead
to path dependent differences in law firm development and the choice
between growth and syndication. Our point is that demand-side
factors also play an important role in the choice between growth and
syndication.
From the firms' perspectives, time will tell whether growth or
syndication is the best strategy. Ultimately though, the factors that
we identified in Part I-internal organization costs, syndication costs,
the probability distribution of jobs, and legal rules-will have a strong
influence on firm structure within the legal industry.
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III. SYNDICATION AND GROWTH IN ACCOUNTING

Accounting is another project-oriented service industry that fits
our model well. Accounting firms vary widely in size, input resource
mix, legal form, and project capabilities. The large firms have grown
spectacularly in recent years.
Yet some firms regularly use
syndication to share work with others when clients demand
specialized knowledge or other resources beyond one firm's
capabilities, or when regulations prevent a single firm from offering a
range of services.
A.

The Growth of the Big Eight, Six, Five
The most striking feature of the accounting industry is the size,
dominance, and rapid growth of the largest firms. As illustrated by
table 6, the five largest firms, appropriately called the "Big Five,"
earn billions in annual revenues and employ tens of thousands of
workers. The accounting giants dwarf the largest law firms, as can be
seen by comparing table 1 (largest law firms) and table 6 (largest
accounting firms). While some of the accounting firms' growth can be
attributed to internal expansion, much of it was generated by mergers
with other large accounting firms. For example, the 1998 merger of
Price Waterhouse and Coopers & Lybrand created the world's sixtyfirst largest employer"3 with combined revenue in 1999 of over $15
14
billion.
The Big Five have dominated auditing for many years and their
market share is growing. As early as 1956, the then Big Eight firms
audited over seventy percent of the corporations listed on the New
York Stock Exchange." 5 By 1988, their market share had increased
to ninety-six percent of the NYSE-listed companies.1 6 Even though
accounting today goes well beyond auditing, the Big Five dominate
the overall industry as well. In 2000, the Big Five garnered eighty-

113. See Graeme Kennedy, Another Merger and Then There Were Five, NAT'L Bus.
REV., July 2, 1998, at 7, available at 1998 WL 10275640. The firm's name became
PricewaterhouseCoopers, eschewing the blank and the ampersand in the prior names and,
in a unique move, changing the "w" from uppercase to lower case.
114. See Stateside Success, INT'L Accr. BULL., Jan. 29, 1999, available at 1999 WL
13038060.
115. Jeff L. Payne & Morris H. Stocks, More Public Accounting Firm Mergers: What
Will the Impact Be?, 57 OHIO CPA J. 31 (1998) (citing Charles W. Wooton et al., From the
"Big Eight" to the "Big Six" Accounting Firms, OHIO CPA J. 19 (Spring 1990)).
116. Id. at 31.
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four percent of the total11 7 revenue of the one-hundred largest
American accounting firms.
TABLE 6: Largest International Accounting Firms
(Ranked by Revenue)
Rank

Firm Name

Headquarters

1.

PricewaterhouseCoopers

New York

2.

Andersen Worldwide

3.

Ernst & Young
International

4.

KPMG International

5.
6.

Revenue
(Millions)

Offices
Ofcs

Partners
Prnr

staff
tf

$15,300

N/A

10,000

146,000

Chicago

13,900

412

2,788

93,916

New York

10,900

675

6,200

58,700

New York

10,400

825

6,790

64,510

Deloitte & Touche

Wilton, CT

9,000

725

5,608

60,790

BDO International

Brussels

1,601

510

1,732

12,176

Grant Tobrnton
International

Chicago

1,506

584

2,335

12,275

8.

Horwath International

New York

1,185

369

1,790

11,280

9.

RSM International

London

1,182

524

1,864

10,623

Moores
Rowlan
International

London

1,141

603

1,884

10,717

i1.

Summit International
Associates

New York

898

365

1,298

6,610

12.

Nexia International

London

800

213

939

N/A

13.

PFK International

London

788

363

1,302

8,530

14.

Fiducial International

Lyon, France

750

772

N/A

9,350

15.

HLB International

London

750

420

1,200

6,500

16.

Moore Stephens
International

London

669

382

1,153

7.248

17.

AGN International

London

564

325

779

4.722

18.

Maclntyre International

London

429

216

825

2,359

19.

IGAF

Chester, NJ

428

338

809

6,014

20.

BKR International

New York

401

269

740

4,213

10.

0.

Note: The number of partners for Andersen Worldwide seems disproportionately small, and perhaps omits consulting
or another division.
Source: Top 25 InternationalAccounting Networks, INDUS. WK., Jan. 24, 2000, at 44.

In the past two decades, the biggest accounting firms have

expanded rapidly in scope. A generation ago, accounting firms
primarily acted as auditors for clients, providing them with assistance
in preparing their financial statements, and in complying with
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). In 1977, for
117. Rick Telberg, The Right Formula,ACcT. TODAY, Mar. 13, 2000, available at 2000
WL 11747970 (reporting results of an annual survey).
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example, auditing comprised seventy percent of all revenues of the
large firms.11 8 However, auditing work has stagnated in recent
decades,11 9 to the point that auditing now accounts for only thirty
percent of these firms' total revenue.12 0
To supplement traditional auditing work, the big accounting
firms have increasingly provided management consulting services to
their clients. Today, they earn more than half their revenue from
consulting, up from twelve percent in 1977.121 Accounting firms, with
their auditing experience, were already familiar with the intricacies of
corporate operations, management reporting mechanisms, and senior
personnel. With such insights and contacts, advising on how to
improve information flow was a natural extension. The explosion in
information technology drove corporate demand for help in
implementing or improving computer systems, ranging from material
requirements planning to management information systems.
Figure 3 illustrates the range of services offered by a Big Five
accounting firm. Accountants have traditionally had a monopoly
over the provision of auditing services, as we detail in the next part.
However, they face fierce competition in providing the other services
shown in figure 3 and competitors are even making inroads in
auditing by using syndicates with smaller CPA firms, as we detail in
the next part. As figure 3 shows, the traditional auditing base (or
A&A as it is known in the industry, for auditing, accounting, and
assurance services), 122 consists primarily of compiling and attesting to
financial statements of public companies registered with the SEC, as
well as other businesses or government entities.
Tax work is a second substantial practice of the Big Five
accounting firms. Competition in the provision of tax services comes
from law firms, smaller accounting firms, enrolled agents, tax
preparers, large franchisers like H&R Block and Jackson Hewitt,
118. Accountants Should Stick to Auditing, Levitt Says, INVESTOR REL. Bus., May 29,
2000, at 15 [hereinafter Accountants].
119. For example, the 133,000 persons taking the uniform CPA examination in 1996
were fewer than the 138,677 taking it in 1982, and was more than seven percent below the
peak year of 1990, when 143,572 took the CPA exam. See AICPA, THE SUPPLY OF
ACCOUNTING GRADUATES AND THE DEMAND FOR PUBLIC ACCOUNTING RECRUITS-

1997, at tbl.26 (1998); see also Nanette Byrnes, Where Have All the Accountants Gone?,
Bus. WK., Mar. 27, 2000, at 203 (asserting that those taking the CPA exam for the first
time fell forty percent from 1992 to 1998).
120. Accountants,supra note 118, at 15.
121. Id.
122. See Telberg, supra note 117 (defining A&A in Table of Top 50 Firms as
"[a]uditing, accounting and assurance services [and] includ[ing] write-ups, compilations,
reviews and attest").
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computer software programs like Turbotax, and web-based tax
services. The Big Five provide financial services as well, ranging from
retirement planning for individuals to complex corporate
consultations. Their competitors here include brokerage firms, such
as Salomon Brothers and Merrill Lynch, that can leverage the work
from their licenses to broker stocks, as well as financial planning
firms, such as American Express.
Figure 3: The "One-Stop Shopping" Office Tower
PrincipleServices Offered by Big Five Accounting Finns
Main Competitors
Main__Competitors
SLawFirms
* MDPs

_

Type of
Service
Legal

Description of Services
• Tax
- Corporate Transactions
- Litigation Support

* Big Five Spinoffs
• Non-Big Five Accounting Firms
* Pure Consulting Firms
• E-Consultants
* Any Person or Organization Offering
Consulting Services
* Consolidators (e.g., AMEX, CBIZ, or H&R
Block)
• Non-Big Five Accounting Firms
* Brokerage Firms (e.g., Salomon, Merrill
Lynch)
* Insurance Companies
* Banks
SLaw Fims
* Non-Big Five Accounting Firms
Consolidators
• Tax Specialist Firms (e.g., Jackson Hewitt)
* Enrolled Agents
*Tax Preparers
* Non-Big Five Accounting Firms
• Consolidators with Accounting Firm
Syndicates

Consulting

Financial
Services

Tax

Audit and
Accounting

- Information Technology
- Management Consulting

- Financial Planning
- Investment Advice
With Special Licenses:
Mutual Fund & Securities Sales
Insurance Sales
Entity Tax Return Research, Preparation,
and Advice
•Individual Tax Returns
Tax Software
Web Based Tax Services
• Audits of Publicly Traded Companies (SEC)
• Audits of Privately Held Companies
• Audits of Governmental Entities
• Reviews
Compilations
* Projections

Management consulting, as we have said, is the huge growth
business of the Big Five firms. Consulting practices can be extremely
varied, but the most lucrative area presently consists of management
structure or informational technologies consulting, including the
development of web sites and e-commerce. Competition is fierce
here because legal regulation of providers is scant. Anyone can put
up a consulting shingle.
Finally, the Big Five provide legal services, especially in tax,
corporate transactions, and even litigation support. Here the Big Five
are confronting the legal monopoly of lawyers on the practice of law.
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The combination of legal and accounting practices is a highly
contentious area that we analyze in detail in Part III.D.
The last three columns of table 7 show the relative importance to
major accounting firms of the various services (lumping the top three
floors of figure 3 into Management Advisory Services). These data
reveal that accounting and auditing comprise only about one-third of
the revenues of Big Five firms, while roughly one-half comes from
consulting services. Andersen Worldwide is exceptional in earning
over seventy percent of its income from consulting, although this will
undoubtedly change with its split-up that we discuss in Part III.C.
Businesses increasingly demand not only a wider range of
services, but larger projects as well. Companies increasingly need
accounting firms with a worldwide presence. Accounting firms have
responded with spectacular growth through mergers, acquisitions, and
internal expansion. The consolidation of the Big Eight began in 1989,
when Deloitte Haskins & Sells (itself the result of prior mergers, as
were most of the megafirms) merged with Touche Ross, and Ernst &
Whinney combined with Arthur Young, leaving the Big Six." In
1998, Price Waterhouse merged with Coopers and Lybrand. 24 The
result, at least for now, is the Big Five, as depicted in table 6.
Economists have struggled to explain the structure of the
accounting industry. The industry is dominated by a few firms, but
these firms have evolved rapidly, and there is little evidence of
Economies of scale provide one potential
collusive behavior.12
explanation for the dominance of large accounting firms, and
researchers have found some evidence that Big Five firms can
produce lower cost audits for large clients.12 6 Other scholars have
suggested that the largest firms may have an advantage in giving a
signal of quality, or by linking audits with advisory services or with
"deep pocket" insurance.1 27 The Chicago-UCLA school of industrial
123. Robert F. Reilly & Robert P. Schweihs, Financial Planning Considerations in
Valuing Accounting Practices,OHIO CPA J., Apr.-June 2000, at 36.
124. Id. at 36.
125. James A. Yardley et al., Supplier Behavior in the Audit Market, 11 J. ACCT. LIT.
151, 161 (1992) ("High concentration levels may be the result of underlying market
cqnditions rather than collusive behavior.").
126. Id. at 163 ("[E]conomies of scale may be available in the large-client
market....").
127. James Yardley notes that:
[T]here is little evidence that the quality of the audit opinion differs between Big
8 and other CPA firms, [but the] empirical evidence consistently indicates that
type of auditor is associated with client performance. Such an association is
consistent with successful signaling. However, rather than serving as a pure
signal, a Big 8 auditor could assist in the achievement of client performance by
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organization argues that the emergence of fewer and larger firms is
simply the survival of the most efficient competitors.1" Professors
Frank and Cook insist that today's "winner take all" markets lead
inevitably to fewer and more spectacularly successful winners. 129 The
wide variety of theories leads one comprehensive survey to conclude
that "[t]he audit market is not yet well-understood."' 13 0
Our model can help explain the growth of the Big Five. Just as
with law firms, if clients demand more and bigger jobs from
accounting firms, market leaders respond to the change in the
probability distribution of jobs by expanding internally to add new
services, such as management consulting, and by merging with other
accounting firms to provide more inputs. This enables the market
leaders to capture more of these bigger jobs without syndication. The
remaining firms can no longer rely on sharing work between firms,
and so respond by expanding their own scale and scope through
counter-mergers.
Why are the top accounting firms so much bigger than the largest
law firms? Several factors explain these differences. First, the
weaker legal restrictions on accountants' sale of ownership interests
to non-accountants permit accounting firms to offer equity positions
to non-accountants and thereby develop ancillary service businesses,
such as consulting, within their firms. Law firms do not have this
freedom as they are effectively limited to the practice of law."'
Second, the barriers to entry into the accounting profession are lower
than in the legal profession, as it takes only 150 hours of college
education (and passage of several exams) to become a CPA versus
three years of post-graduate work to earn a J.D. Accounting firms
should therefore have an easier time hiring entry-level workers, and
leveraging their work to facilitate expansion strategies. Third, CPA
audit firms serve as implicit guarantors of the accuracy of audited
providing advisory services to management or providing 'deep pocket' insurance
to investors.
Id-at 169-70
128. Id. at 153-54 ("Analysts within [the Chicago-UCLA] school assert that monopoly
is rare, weak, transient, and justified by efficiency."); see also Harold Demsetz, Two
Systems of Belief About Monopoly, in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE NEW
LEARNING 164, 177 (H.J. Goldschmid et al. eds., 1974) (noting that when industries are
highly concentrated, the basic reason is the fundamental advantage of large firms in
producing goods more efficiently and at a higher profit than small firms).
129. See ROBERT H. FRANK & PHILIP J. COOK, THE WINNER-TAKE-ALL SOCIETY
2-3 (1995).
130. Yardley et al., supra note 125, at 178.
131. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4 (2001) (prohibiting
lawyers from sharing fees or entering into business enterprises with non-lawyers).
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financial statements. Mega-accounting firms have an advantage over
smaller firms with respect to name recognition by investors, greater
financial capital to stand behind audits, the level of expertise
concerning compliance with SEC requirements, and the quality
control procedures. Law firms do not serve quite the same function
in the eyes of third parties nor under the federal securities laws.
However, the Big Five face pressure on several different fronts as
they expand their scope. Additionally, their dominance over the
auditing business is being challenged by a group of new competitors
who offer many of the same services.
B.

The Accounting Consolidatorsand Syndication

While the Big Five typically draw the most attention, the rapid
emergence of nontraditional accounting firms is equally significant,
and is putting great pressure on firms within the industry.
Importantly for our thesis, these nontraditional firms, which are
prohibited from conducting audits, often use a form of syndication to
get around legal restrictions and combine auditing services with tax,
financial services, and management consulting.
Explaining the
structure of these upstart firms requires us to briefly sketch the

regulatory rules behind audits.
Certified Public Accountants (CPAs) have a legal monopoly in
audits. By statute1 32 and under SEC rules,133 every publicly traded

corporation must file financial statements with the SEC that have
been certified by a CPA. Thus, the one person every public
corporation must hire is a CPA. 3

CPAs are licensed by the states,

132. See 15 U.S.C. § 77aa(25) (1994) (requiring that a registration statement include a
balance sheet "certified by an independent public or certified accountant"); Id. § 77aa(26)
(requiring that a registration statement include a profit and loss statement "certified by an
independent public or certified accountant").
133. Regulation S-X sets forth the requirements for financial statements required to be
filed under the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, including
"accountant's reports," which are defined as "a document in which an independent public
or certified public accountant indicates the scope of the audit (or examination) which he
has made and sets forth his opinion regarding the financial statements taken as a whole, or
an assertion to the effect that an overall opinion cannot be expressed." Regulation S-X,
Qualifications of Accountants, 17 C.F.R. § 210.1-02(a) (2001). The Commission requires
that CPAs be "registered and in good standing" under the laws of their residence or
principal office, 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01(a) (2001), and that they be independent, 17 C.F.R.
§ 210.2-01(b) (2001).
134. SEC Commissioner, Norman Johnson, has stated that:
Auditors have a special franchise under our securities laws. They are the only
experts that public companies must hire. The value of this franchise would
rapidly deteriorate if auditors became just another consultant to--or advocate
for-their clients. The SEC will continue to enforce independence rules to

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80

under the guidelines of the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants (AICPA), the equivalent of the American Bar
Association for lawyers.
Not only must the individual attesting to the financial statements
be a CPA, but the entity he or she works for must be owned by
CPAs.135 In practice, then, only partnerships of CPAs (or the new
equivalent, LLPs) can perform audits. Traditional accounting firms,
including the Big Five firms, are structured as partnerships comprised
principally of individuals licensed as CPAs. They hold a monopoly on
auditing financial statements.
Over the past few years, financial corporations not structured as
CPA partnerships have entered the consulting branch of the
accounting industry. Many of these firms are publicly traded
corporations, with access to immense amounts of capital. In the year
2000 ranking shown in table 7, five non-attest firms,136 as non-CPA
firms are sometimes called, were among the fifteen largest accounting
firms. Two are tax-oriented companies: H&R Block and Jackson
Hewitt. The other three are a new breed called "consolidators":
American Express, Century Business Services (CBIZ), and RSM
McGladrey (an H&R Block subsidiary). These firms offer a wide
range of business and tax consulting services to mid-size businesses.
Consolidators have grown since the mid-1990s by purchasing
CPA accounting firms. The consolidator keeps the tax, consulting,
accounting, financial planning, and other lines of business that can be
performed without a CPA license. It spins off and works in
syndication with the stump CPA-only firm that continues to perform
audits. In this way, the consolidators and their "captive" CPA firms
can compete with the auditing and consulting services of Big Five and
other CPA firms.

maintain the public's confidence in our system of financial reporting.
Norman S. Johnson, Remarks at the Securities Regulation Institute (Jan. 27,
2000), availableat 2000 WL 122587, at *3.
135. AICPA CODE OF PROF'L CONDUcT R. 505 (dealing with "Form of Organization
and Name"). Until 1994, it required an auditing firm to be owned only by CPAs. The
relaxation of Rule 505 is discussed infra,at notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
136. Non-CPA firms are often called non-attest firms because they cannot attest to an
audit.
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TABLE 7: Largest U.S. Accounting Organizations,
Including Non-Attest Firms
(Ranked by Revenue)
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Note: Figures are for U.S. operations only.

Source: Rick Telberg, Hitting New High with Heady Growth, Accr. TODAY, Mar. 13, 2000. at A4.

The arrangements between the consolidator and the CPA stump
are complex. For example, in 1997, the partners of Checkers, Simon
and Rosner, a prominent accounting firm, sold their entire practice to
American Express.137 American Express gave Checkers a license to
continue to meet the attest needs of their former clients. Checkers's
partners remained partners of that firm but also became employees of
American Express. Former Checkers employees became employees
of American Express, but were leased back to Checkers as needed to
perform attest services. 138 The purchase was structured so that
Checkers maintains some financial independence. Checkers can price

137. Dan L. GoIdwasser, Independence in a Changing Accounting Profession, CPA J.,
Oct. 1999, at 46, 48.
138. Id.
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its attest services as it chooses and can hire employees from sources
other than American Express. It maintains its own liability insurance
coverage and has a separate bank account. Checkers's partners are
responsible for training employees leased from American Express. 139
Other consolidators have created similar, complex syndications
of consulting, financial, and auditing services. For instance, H&R
Block is a publicly traded corporation that traditionally provided tax
services to individuals and small businesses. In addition to tax,
mortgage, and financial subsidiaries, H&R Block has created RSM
McGladrey, a large tax, accounting, and consulting firm. It did so by
acquiring McGladrey & Pullen, keeping the tax and consulting
operations and affiliating them with RSM International, and
maintaining the M&P partnership as a syndicated attest firm. 140
Perhaps a stranger entry into accounting is Century Business
Services (CBIZ). It started in the waste management field,' 41 but
since 1996 has become a major consolidator of accounting firms. a42 Its
typical pattern is to buy a midsize accounting firm in a particular city,
and combine it under common ownership with other business
consultants such as insurance agencies, employment benefits, and
technology firms. 43 As with the other non-attest firms, CBIZ keeps
the CPA firms separate.M
Despite the complex legal relationships that accompany the
takeover by a consolidator, the day-to-day reality of the residual CPA
firm remains unchanged. In terms of figure 3, the bottom-floor
auditors remain in the CPA partnership, continuing to do the attest
work. Persons on the upper floors now become employees of the
consolidator, but in many cases continue their working relationships
with the first-floor, legally independent auditors. Undoubtedly, the
complexity is costly, but necessary to counter the monopoly that
CPAs have over audits. Syndication allows the consolidators to
139. 1& at 48.
140. A CPA Firm Goes Public,CPA J., Oct. 1999, at 8.
141. See generally Mary Varnac, A Question of Credibility: Century Business Services
Tries to Regain Wall Street's Trust, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, May 14,2000, at 1H (providing
a brief history of CBIZ starting out in the waste management field).
142. Kent Hoover, Accounting Firms Rethink Urge to Merge, ORLANDO BUS. J., Apr.
28, 2000, at 10.
143. See Varnac, supra note 141; see also Heather Timmons, Creative Accounting at
Century?, Bus. WK., Feb. 21, 2000, at 142-43 (noting that CBIZ purchased over onehundred such companies in two years).
144. See Michael Hooper, Accounting Firm Offers Employees Ownership, TOPEKA
CAP.-J., June 11, 1999, availableat 1999 WL 20053540 ("To get around that, consolidators
have created two separate firms, one for auditing and reviews to be done by CPAs and the
other firm to handle business, tax and consulting service.").
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compete with Big Five firms for many of the same complex, multifaceted projects that require auditing and consulting expertise.
Again, our model offers a convincing theory for why these firms
have developed in this manner. Clients want one-stop shopping to
meet their financial, tax, consulting, and auditing needs. Legal
regulations require non-accounting firms, especially publicly held
ones, to find a partner that can supply auditing services. The nonattest companies use syndication with captive CPA firms to offer
these services. Syndication becomes their preferred strategy because
they are prohibited from owning their own accounting businesses.
Thus, syndication acts as a way of circumventing legal restrictions on
creating a single firm, rather than a mechanism for obtaining more
resources. Part III.D demonstrates how the Big Five have developed
a similar strategy as part of their approach to entering the legal
industry.
C. Divorce of Big Five Auditing and Consulting Services
Traditional auditing firms are restricted to the partnership or
LLP form of governance by the requirement that only independent
CPAs conduct audits. While enjoying their monopoly status for
audits, in recent years the traditional auditing firms have complained
that their governance restrictions harm them in the lucrative
consulting market, where they must compete with unrestricted and
well-financed consultants. 14 5 In particular, consultants and accounting
consolidators that are publicly traded corporations have ready access
to capital through the stock market, which the traditional auditing
firms cannot tap.
The 1990s saw a loosening of the CPA partnership requirements.
In 1994, the AICPA modified Rule 505 of the Code of Professional
Conduct, so that CPAs need only hold two-thirds of the ownership
interests in their audit firm provided that the other owners are also
actively engaged in providing services to firm clients. 46 The Uniform
Accountancy Act, promulgated in 1997, would reduce the CPA
ownership requirement to a mere one-half.147 As the ownership
145. See Gerald M. Ward, The Big-Five Battle: CPAs and Non-CPAs Square Off [On]
Auditor Independence, FIN. EXECUTIVE, Jul.-Aug. 1998, at 32,33.
146. LARRY

P. BAILEY,

1999 MILLER

GAAS GUIDE:

A

COMPREHENSIVE

RESTATEMENT OF STANDARDS FOR AUDITING, ATTESTATION, COMPILATION AND

REVIEW (Harcourt Brace Professional Publishing 1999).
147. UNIFORM ACCt. ACT § 7(c)(1) (1999).
Section 7(c)(1) of the Uniform
Accountancy Act now calls for simple majority ownership:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a simple majority of the ownership
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restrictions have eased, the Big Five firms have shared ownership
with non-CPA partners, particularly from the consulting divisions.
Powerful forces, however, are seeking tighter restrictions on
auditors, demanding a high level of independence. The SEC has long
railed against non-CPA ownership of U.S. auditing firms and
combining auditing and consulting services."' The SEC forcefully
argues that U.S. dominance as the world's leader in financial markets
arises in large part because of the transparency and integrity of its

financial reporting system. 1 49 It believes that relaxation of the
ownership requirements will erode the public trust in auditor
independence to the point where American securities markets could

lose their dominance.
To accompany its dramatic rhetoric, the SEC offered several
initiatives to restrict non-CPA ownership. 150 Responding to a
recommendation from the General Accounting Office, in May 1997
the SEC and AICPA jointly created the Independent Standards
Board to "unify, maintain, and improve independence standards" for
external auditors of SEC registrants.15' One-half of the board's
sixteen members are non-CPA public members. The SEC also
proposed revisions of the independence requirements of Regulation

S-X.' 5 The SEC proposal mentions twenty-five percent as a possible
of the CPA firm, in terms of financial interests and voting rights of all partners,
officers, shareholders, etc., must belong to individuals licensed as CPAs in some
state and the partners, officers, shareholders, etc., eligible for licensure as CPAs
must be licensed in the state in which they have their principal place of business
and perform professional services.
Id. § 7(c)(1). As of March 1999, at least forty-five states had adopted the Uniform
Accountancy Act and its relaxed ownership standards for auditing firms. Forty-fifth State
Signs up to Uniform Accountancy Act, AccT., Mar. 1,1999, at 5.
148. Regulation S-X declares that an accountant will be considered not independent if
he, his firm, or any member of his firm has "a direct financial interest or a material indirect
financial interest" in the firm being audited. Regulation S-X, Qualifications of
Accountants, 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01(c)(1) (2001).
149. Lynn E. Turner, Remarks at the 27th Anniversary Securities Regulation Institute
(Jan. 27, 2000), available at 2001 WL 101317, at *1 (speaking on the shifting paradigms in
self-regulation).
150. See Revision of the Commission's Auditor Independence Requirements, 65 Fed.
Reg. 43,148 (proposed July 12, 2000) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 210 & 240), available
at http://wwv.sec.gov/rules/finalI33-7919.htm.
151. J. Gregory Jenkins, A Declarationof Independence, J. ACC., May 1999, available
at 1999 WL 9362668.
152. The SEC proposed three alternative methods of ensuring the independence of
auditors: (1) Draw a bright-line by prohibiting auditors from providing any non-audit
services to audit clients.
Revision of the Commission's Auditor Independence
Requirements, 65 Fed. Reg. at 43,173; (2) Permit an umbrella "holding entity" to own
affiliated entities separated by a firewall. On one side of the wall would be an "audit
entity" consisting of natural outgrowth services, such as tax and financial advising. On the

2001]

MEGAFIRMS

threshold. The SEC's proposals would also address a favorite
technique of consolidators: leasing employees to their captive audit
firms. If a captive audit firm leases personnel from an entity to
perform audit services, and if that leased person performs a majority
of the hours on the engagement, then the actions and interests of the
leased employee are attributable to the audit firm.
In addition to the regulatory pressures to maintain independent
audits, the Big Five firms face strong internal tensions that threaten to
pull apart their diverse accounting and consulting operations. The
most outstanding illustration of these tensions between firm branches
is the battle within Andersen Worldwide. In 1989, Arthur Andersen
split into an accounting unit (which kept the name Arthur Andersen)
and a consulting unit (called Andersen Consulting), held together by
a parent
company, Andersen
Worldwide
(the "1989
Restructuring").153 The 1989 Restructuring called for yearly revenue
sharing by the more profitable unit, which has consistently been
Andersen Consulting (AC). Indeed, AC has paid nearly $1 billion
since 1989 to its sibling, creating strong tensions between the two
units. The 1989 Restructuring also allowed the accounting unit to
offer its own consulting services to small companies.'54 In 1994,
Arthur Andersen (AA) responded by creating a formal business
consulting operation within the company. 55 By 1997, the business
consulting unit was generating twenty percent of AA's total revenues.
Tensions increased further when Andersen Consulting accused this
business consulting unit of going after Anderson Consulting's own
clients. Increasingly bitter relations between the two siblings
culminated in December 1997 when Andersen Consulting formally
voted to separate from Arthur Anderson. Charges and countercharges by the two firms were submitted for binding arbitration to the
International Court of Arbitration in Paris. In July 2000, the
arbitrator ruled that the two firms should be separated. 56
other side of the wall would be a "consulting entity." Id; (3) Set a threshold whereby nonaudit services would be deemed to impair independence only when the aggregate fees for
these services (excluding tax) surpass a certain level percentage of the audit fee. Id. at
43,174; see also id. at 43,177.
153. ICC Arbitrator Releases Andersen Consulting From Arthur Andersen & Co., 15
MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP., A-1, A-6 (citing In the Arbitration of Andersen Consulting
Business Unit Member Firms v. Arthur Andersen Business Unit Member Firms and
Andersen Worldwide Cooperative, Case No. 9797/CK/AER/ACS, ICC Int. Arb. (July 28,
2000)).
154. Id.
155. Id. at A-9.
156. Id.; Ken Brown, Andersen Consulting Wins Independence, WALL ST. J., Aug. 8,
2000. at A3.
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Although Andersen Worldwide suffered the messiest divorce
proceedings, it is not alone in its troubles. At least three of the other
Big Five firms are planning to split their consulting and accounting
practices.157
PricewaterhouseCooper's has announced that its
consulting firm will be spun off from its auditing group. 58 Ernst &
Young has sold its management consulting division to Cap Gemini for
an announced price of $12 billion. 159 KPMG (from the names
Klynveld, Peat, Marwick, and Goerdeler) has separately incorporated
its management consulting services group and is selling off a twenty
160
percent interest.
Firm partners cite regulatory pressure as a motivating factor in
all the recent divestments,'61 but we doubt that all these actions can be
blamed on legal rules. For one thing, the divestments were occurring
before the SEC's proposed regulations, which never became fully
effective, required them. It seems unlikely that the Big Five would
cave in so quickly to regulatory proposals if remaining together in a
megafirm was the most profitable strategy.162
While blaming the regulators may be convenient, we believe that
something more is going on. We suspect that the internal costs of
organization are very high for these megafirms, so that holding
together their diverse branches is an increasing challenge. 63 Some
supporting evidence is that the Andersen split began before the
recent regulatory focus on independence. Maintaining a partnership
where the consulting partners are consistently more profitable than
the accounting partners is difficult. Using the terminology of our
157. See REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, supra note 97, at 16.
158. See Nick Tabakoff, Giant Firms, Small Plans, Bus. REV. WKLY., Mar. 24, 2000,
at 3.
159. Id.
160. Cintra Scott, KPMG Trading White Shoes for Techie Image: Will Wall Street Buy
Into Firm's Facelift Attempt? NAT'L POST, Aug. 24, 2000, at D03; kpmgcampus.com, at
http://www.kpmgcampus.com/campus/know/history/history.asp (last visited Dec. 17, 2001)
(on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
161. See John M. Covaleski, Top CPA Firms Race to Cash Out of Tech Consulting,
ACCT. TODAY, Mar. 13, 2000, at 2; Brent Shearer, Dealing with the Rifts at Accounting
Firms, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS: THE DEALMAKERS J., May 1, 2000, at 3; Tabakoff,
supra note 158, at 3.
162. See Spoilt For Choice, ECONOMIST, July 5, 2001, at 61, 64-65 (asserting that
accounting firm divestments "had little to do with pressure from the SEC and more to do
with a general realization that non-strategic [information-technology] consulting.., sits
more comfortably in an IT-centric conglomerate than it does in an accounting-oriented
one").
163. Other factors may also be important. For example, conflict of interest rules may
have made it difficult for accounting and consulting divisions of the same firm to sustain
the high growth rates for these businesses and led to pressures to separate them.
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model, the internal costs of expansion appear to have reached the
point where it is more efficient for the Big Five to split up and use
syndication as a means of meeting client demand for a broader
variety of services. Notice that these supply-side factors led to the
break-up of firms that had apparently expanded to meet demand-side
client needs.
Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu appears to be alone among the Big
Five in keeping its consulting practice in-house.1" Its stated goal is to
maintain the perceived synergies between auditing and consulting.1 65
If large clients continue to want this one-stop shopping, Deloitte &
Touche (as the U.S. national practice of Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu is
known) is well-positioned to meet the demand. Deloitte & Touche
has publicly argued that regulators should not prohibit this market
choice. 6 6 As the Deloitte & Touche CEO declared in a Wall Street
Journal op-ed piece, the SEC proposal is "bad news for corporate
decision-makers, since it would restrict public companies' freedom of
choice when seeking outside professional services." 167 However,
many investors and corporations prefer auditors and consultants to
come from separate firms. In another Wall Street Journal op-ed
piece published the same month, the head of a large pension fund
declared that it never hires consultants from its auditing firm, and the
assurance of auditor independence gives "an enormous benefit" to
the fund and its investors."s The key policy question is whether
market forces or regulation should determine the appropriate balance
between auditing independence and consulting synergies.
The SEC's argument for regulating the accounting industry to
ensure the independence of auditors from consultants seems to
proceed in this manner. Allowing firms to mix the two groups

164. Tabakoff, supra note 158, at 4; see Deloitte & Touche, at http://wwx.dttus.com
(last visited Dec. 17,2001) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
165. James Copeland, CEO of Deloitte & Touche, has declared that auditing firms
need professionals who:
[P]rovide consultative services in complex areas like information technology, risk
management and actuarial science" because "the businesses and systems that
auditors test are growing more diversified and complex, and we need expertise to
perform the highest quality audits. To attract and retain top specialists, public
accounting firms must offer them a chance to work on cutting-edge projects, on a
level playing field with other world-class consultancies ....
James E. Copeland, Jr., Editorial, Accounting Ain't Broke, So Don't Fix It,
WALL ST. J., July 25, 2000, at A22.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. See John H. Biggs, Editorial, Auditors and Consultants Shouldn't be too Close,
WALL ST. J., July 13, 2000, at A26.
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together may taint the quality of audits because consultants have an
interest in getting more business from the client and therefore may
lean on the accountants to accommodate the client's demands. 169 This
potential reduction in audit quality adversely affects the securities
markets because third parties, such as investors, rely on the quality of
the audit.1 70 Government regulation is needed to ensure that
securities markets are not harmed.
Investors cannot rely solely on
the decision of the firm's manager about who to hire because they
may choose low-quality auditors. 172 True, the choice of low-quality
auditors will harm the firm's stock price if investors shun its stock,
and thus the firm itself has an incentive to hire high-quality auditors.
But if investors cannot differentiate between firms that hire good and

bad auditors, bad information enters the marketplace."
This will
create a lemons problem that hurts the price of all stocks. 74 In other
words, if markets are imperfect, and investors do not distinguish
between high and low-quality auditors, then the SEC must require
audit firms to be separate from consultants to ensure that all firms are
not penalized for some firms' decisions to hire low quality auditors.
Acting on its theory, in November 2000 the SEC changed its
auditor independence regulations, 75 adopting a two-pronged
169. Irving Faught, Auditor Independence Builds Confidence, DAILY OKLAHOMAN
(Oklahoma City, Okla.), Nov. 30, 2000, at 3C (asserting that government regulation
minimizes improper influence and promotes investor confidence); see also Spoilt For
Choice, supra note 162, at 65 (discussing accounting problems at Waste Management that
may have resulted from a conflict of interest). In fact, the first study to examine this
question using data that was disclosed under the new SEC rules confirms that the
provision of non-audit services impairs auditor independence and reduces the quality of
company earnings. Richard M. Frankel et al., Auditor Independence and Earnings
Quality (research paper, Stanford University Graduate School of Business) (2001).
170. Faught, supranote 169.
171. See id. (asserting that government regulation minimizes improper influence and
promotes investor confidence).
172. Michael Mulligan, New Rules on Auditor-ClientRelationships,NAT'L L.J., Jan. 15,
2001, at B13 (noting that accountants do not follow their own professional standards,
which has forced the SEC to adopt new auditor independence rules of its own).
173. See Testimony of Federal Reserve Officials, 86 FED. RES. BULL. No. 11, at 735
(Nov. 21, 2000) (testimony of Laurence H. Meyer).
174. J. Edward Ketz & Paul B.W. Miller, The De-myth-tification of Accounting and
Auditing, Accr. TODAY, Apr. 3,2000, at 14-15.
175. The proposed rules appear at 65 Fed. Reg. 43,148 (July 12, 2000) (codified at 17
C.F.R. § 210.2-10). A discussion of the final rules appears in Revision of the Commission's
Auditor Independence Requirements, Exchange Act Release No. 33-7919, [2000-2001
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 86,406, at 83,989 (Nov. 21, 2000), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-7919.htm [hereinafter Revised Independent Auditor
Requirements]. For an in-depth discussion of the new rules, see generally William R.
McLucas & Paul R. Eckert, The Securities and Exchange Commission's Revised Auditor
Independence Rules, 56 BUS. LAW. 877 (2001).
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approach to auditor independence.176 First, the SEC created a
general standard of independence that asks whether a fully informed
"reasonable investor" would conclude the accountant is capable of
independent judgment on all issues.'77 Second, the SEC enumerated

a non-exclusive

list of specific situations in which auditor

independence is inherently corrupted.'78 Of particular relevance is
the SEC's declaration that an accountant is not independent if, during
an audit period, the accountant provides information-technology or
other consulting services,17 9 or legal services, 8 0 to the audit client.

The new SEC regulations may be less invasive than accounting
firms had feared. They do not completely ban firms from providing
consulting services to their audit clients. Rather, they take a self-

avowedly "pragmatic approach" by requiring only that companies
disclose the fees paid to their auditor for consulting services 's and

setting forth five procedural conditions for mixing, auditing, and
consulting."s

These disclosures have shown that the non-audit fees

176. Revised Independent Auditor Requirements, supra note 175, at 84,010.
177. 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01(b) states the test as whether "a reasonable investor with
knowledge of all relevant facts and circumstances would conclude that the accountant is
not capable of exercising objective and impartial judgment on all issues encompassed
within the accountant's engagement." See Joanne Rockness et al., Auditor Independence:
A Bit More Rope, FIN. EXECUTIVE, Jan. 1, 2001, at 18, 19-22.
178. See 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01(c)(1)-(5) (2001); Revised Independent Auditor
Requirements, supra note 175, at 83,991.
179. See 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01(c)(4)(i)-(viii) (2001) (restricting accountants from
engaging in bookkeeping, financial information systems design and implementation,
appraisal or valuation services or fairness opinions, actuarial services, internal audit
services, management functions, human resources, or broker-dealer services).
180. See 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01(c)(4)(ix) (2001) (prohibiting accountants from engaging
in legal services).
181. The SEC articulated its self-avowed leniency regarding this restriction in its final
ruling on the matter:
The rule also takes a pragmatic approach to the potential independence problem
posed by the economic incentives that accompany large consulting contracts.
Rather than effectively ban those relationships, we are amending the proxy
disclosure rules to require public companies to make specific disclosure of fees
paid to their auditor for information technology services.
Revised Independent Auditor Requirements, supra note 175, at 84,059-60.
182. 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01(c)(4)(ii)(B)(1)-(5) (2001). First, "[t]he audit client's
management has acknowledged in writing to the accounting firm and the audit client's
audit committee.., the audit client's responsibility to establish and maintain a system of
internal accounting controls." Id. Second, the audit client's management must designate
an employee in senior management "to make all the management decisions with respect
to the design and implementation." Id. The third condition clarifies the types of
"management decisions" the particular employee will be required to make. Id. The last
two conditions require the audit client to make an independent evaluation of "the
adequacy and results of the design and implementation of the hardware or software
system." Id.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80

paid by Standard & Poor's (S&P) 500 company clients to Big Five
firms dwarf the size of the audit fee. A Wall Street Journal study of
307 S&P 500 companies which had made these disclosures found that
"the fees for [nonaudit] services were nearly three times as big as the
audit fees. Specifically, those companies paid a combined $909
million [in 2000] for auditing services, compared with $2.65 billion for
other services, including $554 million for information-technology
services.

15 3

What light can our model shed on these upheavals in accounting?
Foremost, these firms' split-ups illustrate how high internal
organization costs can be as firms grow to handle large projects.
These costs are particularly high when one specialty (here,
consulting) consistently out-performs another (here, auditing). The
consultants feel they are subsidizing the auditors, while the auditors
feel under-appreciated. Even if clients value one-stop shopping,
syndication may be a more efficient way to provide services in this
situation. As we saw earlier, the consolidators (who are legally
prohibited from combining consulting and auditing in a single firm)
have found it worthwhile to offer auditing and consulting through
syndicate arrangements. The Big Five firms, coming from the other
direction of unified operations, are also opting for more syndicated
arrangements.
While some commentators have suggested that the recent spinoffs of the Big Five are driven by the new regulatory threats,84
economic forces may be equally crucial. The extra ability to service
huge clients in a single operation may not be worth the internal costs,
given the viability of looser syndicate arrangements. One of the costs
comes from the legal restrictions on auditing ownership.1 58
Consultants freed of these restrictions can tap public capital markets
to raise cash. As our model suggests, firms must balance the agency
costs of internal growth with the transaction costs of syndication. In
the case of auditing and consulting, time will tell if syndication will
183. Jonathan Weil & Jeffrey Tannenbaum, Big Companies Pay Audit Firms More for
Other Services, WALL ST. J., Apr. 10, 2001, at Cl; see also Jonathan Weil, New Disclosure
Rules Became Issue for Raytheon, WALL ST. J., May 3, 2001, at Cl (discussing how
Raytheon restated its financial results for three years, and that plaintiffs' lawyers are
concerned that the company paid its auditors, PricewaterhouseCoopers, three-million
dollars in audit fees and forty-eight million dollars for other services).
184. See Ken Brown & Mary Morrison, War of the Andersens Draws to a Close As
ArbitratorSubmits Ruling to Court, WALL ST. J., July 14, 2000, at C1 ("[S]ome of Arthur
Andersen's big rivals have dumped or are exiting their consulting businesses to satisfy the
regulators.").
185. See 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01(c)(1).
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prove to be the more efficient option if SEC regulations are not

prohibitive.
D. MultidisciplinaryPracticeof Accounting and Law
In sharp contrast to their efforts to shed their consulting

divisions, the Big Five have been moving full bore into the legal
industry. Clients of these firms have been clamoring for them to offer

a full range of legal services.'86 The biggest accounting firms want to
transform themselves into integrated professional service providers,
commonly referred to as Multidisciplinary Practice firms (MDPs). 1 7
These firms have been building up their internal legal groups in
recent years, aggressively recruiting partners from law firms and
Arthur Andersen
hiring students straight out of law school."l
currently employs over 3,500 lawyers, more than any law firm in the
world.189 Its legal unit, Andersen Legal, saw its revenues increase by
over thirty percent in 1999, reaching $482 million for the fiscal year.190
PricewaterhouseCoopers currently employs over 1,600 lawyers in
forty-two different countries in its Landwell unit. 91 It has declared its
intention to become one of the world's five largest law firms within
the next five years. 92 The other Big Five firms also have large

186. Margaret A. Jacobs, Accounting Firms Covet ForbiddenFruit: Piece of U.S. Legal
Market, WALL ST. J., May 31, 2000, at BI; Fischel, supra note 63, at 960 (stating that
general counsels of major corporations and commercial entities are the clients most
actively demanding changes to current rules).
187. David Jackson, Corporate Legal Services--Customers Set to Benefit as SA Will
Follow the Worldwide Trend Towards MDPs, Bus. DAY (South Africa), May 8, 1999, at
24 ("The worldwide trend toward multidisciplinary practices (MDPs) is boosting
competition in what has been the separate domains of the legal and accounting
professions. Driving this move is the globalization of business and the emergence of
international accounting firms as players in the market for specialist services."); Paul
Merrion, Auditors at Law: Attorneys Fret as CPAs Encroach on Their Turf, CRAIN'S CHI.
Bus., Jan. 17,2000, at 15.
188. REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, supra note 97, at 15 (noting the Big
Five's success in recruiting "tax partners from leading law firms and prominent
government lawyers to join the Big Five, and in persuading law students to join their staffs
directly after graduation rather than following the more traditional law-firm career path");
UPDATED BACKGROUND REPORT supranote 102, at 2; Fischel, supra note 63, at 952.
189. Jacobs, supranote 186.
190. REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, supra note 97, at 16 n.50. This was
more than double that of the average American Lawyer Top 100 law firm.
191. REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, supra note 97, at 17.
192. See Roger Trapp, Big Five Take the Law Into Their Own Hands, THE
INDEPENDENT (London), May 31, 2000, at 6, available at 2000 WL 17611161 ("Already
claiming to be the world's fourth-largest legal practice, with 1,450 lawyers, excluding tax
specialists, [PricewaterhouseCoopers] has a vision to be in the top five global providers of
legal services by reputation rather than size by 2004.").
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numbers of lawyers working for them. 193 Indeed, as table 7 shows,
each Big Five firm is among the top-thirty international law firms.
While this growth continues unabated, substantial barriers to the

creation of MDPs in most countries remain.
Historically, accounting firms have been forbidden to offer legal
services. 94 The most that law firms and accounting firms could do
was refer clients to one another. When clients had matters that
required both accounting and legal services, firms from both areas
would work together to handle these jobs. But they could not share
profits because of legal prohibitions against such activity. These
arrangements were informal and could change between jobs.
Over the past decade, clients have started to demand integrated

legal and accounting services from one company. 195 Increases in the
number of international mergers and acquisitions and other complex
business transactions have led clients to seek out more efficient ways
of obtaining professional services.196 The demand for MDPs is driven
by the clients' sense that these arrangements would be a more
efficient, less costly way for them to deal with complex matters that
have legal, accounting, and management issues. 197 Clients' demands
have shifted the probability distribution for future jobs, leading the
Big Five to build up their internal legal groups.
This process began in the tax area. Accountants are heavily
involved in the tax planning of most major businesses. These matters
have significant legal aspects to them, which accounting firms had
193. UPDATED BACKGROUND REPORT, supra note 102, at 6 (summarizing the
American Lawyer's November 1998 report stating that KPMG employed 988 lawyers,
Ernst & Young had 851 attorneys, and Deloitte & Touche had 586 attorneys world-wide).
194. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4 (2001); text accompanying note
210.
195. REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, supra note 97, at 12-13 ("The
Commission is firmly convinced that there is substantial evidence of client interest in
expanding the universe of legal service providers to include MDPs."); Bartel, supra note
35, at 5 (asserting that multinational firms like one-stop shopping because they can reduce
the number of law firms that they are dealing with, thereby getting better management of
their legal matters, lowering their legal fees and overhead, and assuring better quality).
The ABA report also noted that the American Corporate Counsel Association is urging
the elimination of legal barriers to the establishment of MDPs. Id. at 14.
196. Fischel, supranote 63, at 970.
197. REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, supra note 97, at 13 (noting the need for
multidisciplinary counseling for clients in some matters and that it is inefficient to try to
satisfy that need with coordinated advice from professionals in unrelated firms);
Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 34, at 118-24; Fischel, supra note 63, at 963 ("MDPs
are premised on the assumption that different service providers within a single firm can
share information about clients' needs and coordinate possible strategies more efficiently
than if the same services are purchased from multiple firms."); Breakley, supra note 34, at
276.
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traditionally farmed out to law firms to avoid claims that they were
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. Over time, the
accounting firms realized that this legal prohibition had few teeth:
most of their tax clients' legal issues could be handled by their own inhouse lawyers. So long as the in-house lawyers avoided appearing in
court to handle litigation (something that few tax lawyers do),
technically they do not practice law.9 8 The firms started aggressively
hiring tax partners from major law firms. Clients began to routinely
have their accounting firms handle all of their tax matters, except for
litigation.
Today, all of the Big Five firms offer these services and their
legal groups have prospered. These professional service firms
aggressively solicit clients, seeking to provide the same services that
traditional law firms have supplied. 99 Their legal services groups
have expanded rapidly with the benefit of cross-selling by their
accounting/consulting partners. They have also benefited because
they can deliver legal services efficiently using the sophisticated
technologies that they developed to service their accounting and
consulting clients.2°
The legal-accounting affiliations are most developed in Europe,
where the legal prohibitions against MDPs have come under pressure
to acknowledge modern realities. Switzerland allows fully integrated
MDPs. 2°1 Many other foreign countries are considering permitting
full-blown MDPs, with England leading the way with proposed
legislation legalizing the creation of these entities.2" In the interim,
the Big Five have engaged in intermediate contractual arrangements
with English law firms, including cross-identification on letterhead
and advertising, cross-referral of clients, and purchasing of consulting

198. See Jacobs, supra note 186 ("The major accounting firms have long employed inhouse attorneys who offer advice on taxes and certain other topics but who technically
don't practice law.").
199. COMMISSION ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE, BACKGROUND PAPER ON
ISSUES AND DEVELOPMENTS (Jan. 1999), at 3
MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE:

[hereinafter MDP BACKGROUND PAPER].
200. Joseph L. Kashi, Technology and Economics Are Changing How You Practice
Law, 20 L. PRAC. MGMT. 44,46 (1994); Pruner, supra note 69.
201. Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice, Appendix C, Reporter's Notes
[hereinafter MDP Reporter's Notes], at 27 n.11 (stating that ATAG Ernst & Young is the
biggest law firm in Switzerland).
202. REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, supra note 97, at 17 (summarizing some
of the regulatory responses that various countries have taken or are currently considering
that would affect MDPs); UPDATED BACKGROUND REPORT, supra note 102, at 3-4
(detailing various foreign countries' bar associations' actions concerning MDPs).
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and supplies0 3
These new affiliates provide legal services directly to clients,
even for complex mergers and acquisitions and corporate finance
issues.2" At PricewaterhouseCoopers in Paris, for instance, the law
firm is owned by the attorneys, but they also "share the same client
base as the accounting firm, work very closely with it, and benefit
from volume cost savings within the PricewaterhouseCoopers
network that result from leasing space in the same office building as
the accounting firm, bulk buying, [and] the common use of telephone
and computer systems."2 °5 While most of their clients are small at
present, the Big Five have publicly stated that0they
intend to compete
6
firms
law
international
major
the
with
directly
The European experience fits well within the framework of our
model. Given the choice between internal expansion and syndication,
the Big Five would rather create MDPs by internally expanding to
meet the shift in current (and predicted future) client demand for
integrated professional service firms.
Since legal restrictions
currently limit the availability of this option, these firms have created
syndicates with captive law firms to get around the legal rules.2 7
Simultaneously, these firms and their clients are pushing to have the
legal rules changed to permit the formation of lMDPs. 2 °
We would predict that as the rules change, and MDPs become
feasible in many countries, many firms will rush to meet clients'
demands for integrated services. The Big Five will have a significant
head start, but large international law firms, consulting firms, and
consolidators will quickly try to catch up through mergers and
203. The Big Five have limited their activities to:
[Contractual arrangements with law firms, whereby (1) the law firm agrees to
identify its affiliation with the professional services firm on its letterhead and
business cards, and in its advertising ...; (2) the law firm and the professional
services firm agree to refer clients to each other on a nonexclusive basis; and (3)
the law firm agrees to purchase goods and services from the professional services
firm such as staff management, communications technology, and rent for the
leasing of office space and equipment. The law firm remains an independent
entity controlled and managed by lawyers and accepts clients who have no
connection with the professional services firm.
MDP Reporter's Notes, supra note 201, at 27. These arrangements would run afoul of the
legal restrictions in the U.S.
204. Jacobs, supra note 186.
205. MDP BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 199, at 5.
206. Jacobs, supra note 186.
207. MDP Reporter's Notes, supra note 201, at 4 n.12 (listing testimony of various
witnesses concerning captive law firm arrangements).
208. Id. (listing testimony of various accounting firm representatives and changes in
European country restrictions that resulted).
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acquisitions. A wave of aggregation should sweep across European
firms in different nations as those countries drop their barriers to
MDPs.
In the United States, legal rules currently prevent firms from
creating MDPs. 2°9 The prohibitions come from both the law and
accounting regulations. On the legal side, Rule 5.4 of the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct prohibits lawyers from forming
partnerships with non-lawyers if any of the activities of the
partnership constitutes the practice of law.2 10 On the accounting side,
the new SEC regulations find a breach of auditor independence if the
auditing firm provides any service to an audit client that requires an
attorney "admitted to practice" before a U.S. court'
The SEC
echoes the view of the ABA's Commission on Multidisciplinary
Practice, stating that "[we] explicitly recognize[] the incompatibility
[of legal and audit services]. [We] do not believe that a single entity
should be allowed to provide legal and audit services to the same
client. 212 Despite the strong rhetoric, the SEC regulations continue
to permit Big Five firms to offer lawyers to their clients so long as the
lawyers are not practicing law before a U.S. court. This "loophole"
will allow the Big Five firms to continue expanding their legal
departments, even in the United States, 21 3 although full-blown MDPs
are not yet permitted.
Just as in Europe, the American experience is that syndicate-like
arrangements arise when accounting firms are legally barred from
providing full legal services. These arrangements, while perhaps not
as economically efficient as the internal expansion of the Big Five in
Europe, are a second-best way of trying to satisfy client demand in
the United States.
The most provocative of these arrangements is the creation of
the law firm of McKee Nelson Ernst & Young (now McKee Nelson,
209. See Fischel, supra note 63, at 951-52 (detailing various rules which prohibit or
restrict the emergence of MDPs).
210. Id.
211. See Regulation S-X, Qualifications of Accountants, 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01(c)(4)(ix)
(2001) (stating there is a breach of auditor independence by "[p]roviding any service to an
audit client under circumstances in which the person providing the service must be
admitted to practice before the courts of a United States jurisdiction").
212. Revised Independent Auditor Requirements, supra note 175, at 83,995 (quoting
the REPORT TO HOUSE OF DELEGATES, supra note 97).
213. See Nathan Koppel, A Regulator Budges (and Fudges) on MDPs, AM. LAw., Jan.
2001, at 20 (concluding that SEC regulations will allow Big 5 to expand their legal
services); Geanne Rosenberg, SEC's New Rules Will Likely Allow Big Five to Expand
Legal Services, NAT'L LJ., Dec. 4, 2000, at B7 (predicting that legal branches of the Big
Five will probably expand or at least maintain the status quo).
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LLP) in Washington, D.C. in November

1999.214 Five partners of the
King & Spalding law firm left to create their own law firm but with a

very unusual financial relationship with the accounting firm Ernst &
Young. The law firm agreed to include the Ernst & Young name as
part of its name in exchange for a "significant amount of start up
capital" and a lease in Ernst & Young's building.2" 5 This represents a
major step
by one of the Big Five accounting firms in the direction of
216
MDPs.
Other Big Five firms have entered into strategic alliances with

American
law
firms
over
the
past
few
years.
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) entered into an agreement with a tax
specialty firm, Miller & Chevalier, in 1997. Miller & Chevalier will
provide litigation services for PwC's clients that need to fight "high
stakes, complex tax controversies in the United States. ' 21 In 1999,
KPMG, another Big Five firm, announced a strategic alliance with
law firms that belong to Saltnet, a network of tax lawyers.2"8 This
group includes well-known law firms Morrison & Foerster and
Horwood Marcus & Berk.
Despite the growth of hybrid arrangements, pressure is growing
on U.S. legal regulators to abandon the existing restrictions on MDPs.
Critics argue the current system is an anticompetitive barrier erected
by an interest group, the organized bar, to protect its turf,219 and
results in higher prices and fewer services for clients. 20 If clients go to
the organization that can most effectively solve their problems, then
214.
215.
216.
217.

REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, supra note 97, at 14.
Id.
Id.; UPDATED BACKGROUND REPORT, supra note 102, at 2-3 nn.9-10.
REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, supra note 97, at 15; UPDATED
BACKGROUND REPORT, supra note 102, at 2 n.6.
218. REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, supra note 97, at 15; UPDATED
BACKGROUND REPORT, supra note 102, at 2 n.8.
219. See Fischel, supra note 63, at 953-54, 969-74; Jacobs, supra note 89, at 6; Tunku
Varadarajan, Why is the ABA Afraid of a Little Competition for Lawyers?, WALL ST. J,
July 24, 2000, at A27 (declaring that the ABA voted against multidisciplinary practice to
protect its own economic position).
220. See Cindy Krischer Goodman, One Firm Fits All, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 14, 1999,
at 1E (stating that proponents say that current rules result in higher prices and fewer
services for clients). The American Corporate Counsel Association has endorsed the
move to permit the formation of MDPs. Many small firms are also interested in
permitting these entities to be created. REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, supra
note 97, at 14; see also John S. Dzienkowski & Robert J. Peroni, MultidisciplinaryPractice
and the American Legal Profession: A Market Approach to Regulating the Delivery of
Legal Services in the Twenty-First Century, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 83, 117 (2000) (noting
generally that a more competitive market for professional services should translate into
lower prices).
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lawyers risk being replaced if they fail to adapt to the new
competitive landscape. 221 Traditional American law firms are at a
serious competitive disadvantage, the critics continue, compared to
other service providers that are better financed, have newer
technologies, and offer better cross-professional services.m Perhaps
facing this reality, the ABA's Commission on Multidisciplinary
Practice initially recommended that the ABA House of Delegates
approve some limited changes to the current prohibitions, only to see
its proposals rejected by the full membership.
Defenders of the current system more or less concede that
individual clients may prefer MDPs on efficiency grounds,2 4 although
they suggest that supporters exaggerate current client demand for
MDPs.? Rather, defenders argue that MDPs will severely damage
the legal profession's "core values" of independence, confidentiality,
and self-regulation. 6
Attorneys must "exercise independent
judgment and render candid advice," 7 but will be reluctant to do so
if the candid advice upsets the client who not only chooses another
lawyer for future work, but removes the accounting and consulting
business from the MDP as well.' MDPs risk client confidentiality as
well. Lawyers in a MDP cannot ensure confidentiality because the
duty of the auditor (who is now a fellow employee or partner of the
MDP lawyer) to disclose adverse information will overrule the
attorney-client privilege.229 Another danger of MDPs, say defenders
of the ban, is that lawyers may lose their privilege of regulating
themselves if they are seen as "just another set of service providers in
a department store." 30
As with the SEC's proposed separation of auditing and
consulting services, we need to look critically at the arguments that
the current rules against MDPs address a market failure. The
221. Pruner, supra note 69, at 90-91.
222. Id.
223. See Varadarajan, supra note 219, at A27 (declaring that "[b]y voting against
change, the ABA's delegates confirmed yet again that their instincts are protectionist and
that they subscribe not so much to a free market system as to a guild system").
224. See Lawrence J. Fox, Dan's World: A Free Enterprise Dream; An Ethics
Nightmare, 55 Bus. LAW. 1533,1533 (2000).
225. See Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 34, at 135 (observing that "[o]pponents are
convinced that the demand for integrated professional services is largely manufactured by
the excellent marketing efforts of the Big Five accounting firms").
226. Id. at 137.
227. Fox, supranote 224, at 1540.
228. Id. at 1542.
229. Id. at 1555.
230. Id. at 1551.
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conclusion that regulation is needed rests on the following claims:
Lawyers are licensed officers of the court, who are professionally
inculcated with ethical duties that include zealous representation of
clients within the bounds of the law. In other words, lawyers worry
about misleading courts and agencies, and will not do just anything to
further their client's interests. Society benefits from these ethical
limitations on lawyers' activities.
The second step in the argument is more difficult. Working in
firms with other professionals, such as accountants or consultants, will
taint the independence of lawyers. While many clients may choose to
hire only attorneys that do not suffer from such conflicts, some clients
will not. MDPs will be more willing to serve the selfish interests of
the client because of their greater financial interests in selling a bigger
bundle of services to the client.131 This will lead to more unethical
behavior by lawyers which is bad for society because it leads to
inaccurate results by courts and agencies.
This argument is more problematic than the analogous one
advanced for auditors. For one thing, a stronger claim of third party
reliance exists for accountant certifications than for legal advice.
Much of the federal securities laws are built on the premise that
accountants act as neutral arbiters of generally accepted accounting
practices and other norms, and that investors are entitled to rely on
accountants' opinions in making their investment decisions. By
contrast, lawyers do not have a central role under the federal
securities laws, and there is less reason for investors to heed their
public pronouncements. Second, lawyers act as advocates and
advisors of what is in their client's best interests. Third parties are
aware of this fact, and therefore discount lawyers' public statements
accordingly.
Although we recognize that concerns about attorney
independence remain a major stumbling block to the creation of
MDPs, we predict that these regulatory prohibitions will be
eliminated because they do not permit firms to adjust their size and
composition to respond to new probability distribution of jobs. As
the shift in client demand becomes increasingly clear to all of the
firms affected, and the Big Five's inroads into traditional legal fields
continue to widen, law firms will join the bandwagon of those in favor

231. Cf Robert A. Prentice, The SEC and the MDP: Implications of the Self-Serving
Bias for Independent Auditing, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1597, 1597-1602 (2000) (making a similar
argument about auditors in a MDP).
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of changeY2
As we have documented, however, American law and accounting
firms are already using various forms of syndication to provide joint
services. While less efficient than a fully integrated MDP might be,
many of the perceived costs of MDPs already exist. As these
syndicate arrangements are increasingly used to avoid ethical
restrictions, one wonders whether the independent judgment and the
confidentiality of the lawyers is already compromised. If so, we might
have the worst of both worlds-substantially compromised lawyers
and accountants without the full efficiency gains. It might be better to
let clients choose. Those who are willing to pay for strict separation
of their accountants and lawyers can always get that separation, and
whatever benefits from independent judgment or confidentiality that
come with it. But we do not see how other clients, who prefer the
lower price or higher quality that comes from fully integrated
accountants and lawyers in an MDP, are harming others or "the
market" in general. In the absence of such third-party effects, the
case for regulation is weak. Increased pressure will be brought on the
ABA to drop the prohibition on MDPs.13
If the legal restrictions in the United States crumble, there will be
a rush to create integrated MDPs. Permutations of law firms,
accounting firms, money managers, and consultants will form unions
of various types to try to offer professional services to clients. Many
clients may choose to use separate firms for each of these services, at
least until they are confident that the new entities can provide the
appropriate quality of services without complications.
Over time, a new equilibrium will develop with MDPs as only
one of the players, perhaps the dominant ones, in the market place.
The structure of the new equilibrium will depend on the same
variables that we have focused on throughout this paper: internal
organization costs, syndication costs, the probability distribution of
jobs, the size and structure of other firms, and legal rules. As we saw
in our discussion of the break-up of consulting and accounting firms,
increasing internal organization costs can lead to the conclusion that
bigger is not always better.

232. See Fischel, supra note 63, at 971 (claiming that tax lawyers and large law firms are
most likely to argue in favor of repeal of current prohibitions against MDPs).
233. Cf. id. at 974 (arguing that current rules will lose support as interest group support
for them wanes).
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IV. THE RISE AND FALL OF SYNDICATION IN INVESTMENT
BANKING
The securities underwriting industry provides another good

application for our model. Syndication is a widely used and efficient
form of organization for investment banks that are distributing newly
issued securities.?
In a typical securities underwriting, a group of
investment banks join together under a lead underwriter to market an
issue of stock or bonds to their clients.
When securities underwriting first appeared, issuing companies
did not use syndicates in the distribution of financial securities on
behalf of issuing companies. 5 Only later when clients demanded
that investment banks raise larger sums did syndicates become
popular.z 6 As we explain below, in recent years, investment banks
have grown to take advantage of the shift in the probability
distribution of jobs toward bigger offerings, causing syndicate usage
to decline. A second factor contributing to the decline in syndicate

size is the adoption of Rule 415, the shelf registration rule, 37 and the
resultant increase in the relative costs of syndication.

As with law firms, our model emphasizes the demand side as a
critical explanation for the size and structure of investment banks.
Shifts in the probability distribution of jobs alter the relative costs of
syndication versus internal growth, and can spur internal growth.
Other researchers have focused on the role of syndication as
insurance against financial risk, a "supply-side" explanation of
industry structure."5

While these theories are useful, they are

incomplete. Our model provides additional insights into why firms

234. As one court put it:
This evolution of the syndicate system was in no sense a plan or
scheme invented by anyone. Its form and development were due
entirely to the economic conditions in the midst of which investment
bankers functioned. No single underwriter could have borne alone
the underwriting risk involved in the purchase and sale of a large
security issue. No single underwritercould have effected a successfid
public distributionof the issue.
United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621, 640 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (emphasis added).
235. See infra notes 240-41 and accompanying text.
236. See infra notes 242-48 and accompanying text.
237. Delayed or Continuous Offering and Sale of Securities, 17 C.F.R. § 230.415
(2001).
238. The idea of risk sharing has led to formal analyses of decision-making within a
syndicate. See, e.g., Amin H. Amershi & Jan H.W. Stoeckenius, The Theory of Syndicates
and Linear Sharing Rules, 51 ECONOMETRICA 1407 (1983); Robert Wilson, The Theory of
Syndicates, 36 ECONOMETRICA 119 (1968).
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syndicate securities distributions? 39
Prior to 1870, the marketing of an issuer's securities to investors
was handled by a single firm. A single investment bank would enter
into a contract with the issuer for the purchase of the entire issue at a
particular price.240 The issuer received a fixed sum and shifted the
risks of the market to the investment banker, what today we would
call a firm-commitment underwriting. Subsequently, the investment
banker would attempt to sell the securities at an increased price to its
individual pool of investors.241
Investment banks were small in comparison with today. In the
past, we postulate that they must have had relatively low internal
organization costs because of their smaller scale and narrower scope
than the firms that dominate the market now. The demand for future
services by clients was for banks to raise fairly small amounts of
capital, making syndication unnecessary.
As businesses grew, their capital needs expanded and the size of
securities offerings dramatically increased. It became increasingly
difficult for a single investment banker to underwrite a given issue of
securities. Beginning around 1870, numerous underwriters were
required for a single deal, leading firms to develop the syndication
process.242 By combining forces, the investment banks could market
the larger securities issues needed to meet the increasing demand for
243
capital.
239. A variety of other factors have also contributed to the recent concentration in the
underwriting business, such as, the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act, the end of fixed
commission rates for the brokerage business, the globalization of securities markets, and
the Internet's effects on investment banking. See JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES
REGULATION 217-19 (3d ed. 2001) for further discussion of these factors. Again, our
point is that a demand-side analysis provides a complementary explanation for the
increased size of firms in this area.
240. In the late 1800s, most businesses were small, privately owned manufacturers and
merchants with small capital needs. With the industrial growth of the early 1900s, these
firms needed to raise capital from individual and institutional investors to supply growing
businesses.
KENNETH J. BIALKIN & WILLIAM J. GRANT, JR., SECURITIES
UNDERWRITING: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE 4-6 (1985).
241. LoUIs Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION § 2A.2 (3d ed. 1995).
242. "Jay Cooke is credited with having introduced the "underwriting syndicate" into
this country in the sale of a two million bond issue by the Pennsylvania Railroad in 1870."
LOUIS LOSS, SECURITIES REGULATION 164 (2d ed. 1961).
243. In addition, the syndication process placed less financial liability on each
individual investment bank. An effective syndicate will spread risk amongst investment
banks and contain prestigious bankers to insure market acceptance. It also ensures
distribution of shares to the appropriate type of investor. For instance, placing stock with
numerous smaller investors tends to create a more stable aftermarket for the issue.
PHILIP W. TAGGART & ROY ALEXANDER, TAKING YOUR COMPANY PUBLIC 90-93
(1991).
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Syndication enabled bankers to bring an issuer's securities to
market without having to incur the higher internal organization costs
that would arise if individual firms expanded. Syndication, while
costly, allowed firms to conserve on these expenses. 244 However, the
creation of a large syndicate greatly reduced the revenues earned by
any individual investment bank for a single underwriting because they
had to share the fees with other syndicate members.
In our model's terminology, the probability distribution for
underwriting jobs shifted toward the issuance of larger blocks of
securities toward the turn of the century. However, this did not lead
firms to expand to a large enough size to handle their clients'
underwriting needs by themselves, but rather to engage in
syndication.
Although we lack data to test our theory, we
hypothesize that this shift occurred because syndicates were at that
time a relatively more efficient method of handling these bigger jobs.
During the 1990s, the largest firms have grown considerably,
both through internal expansion and by mergers and acquisitions.
Table 8 compares the annual sales and number of employees for eight
large investment banks in the early and late 1990s. In all cases, the
firms' annual sales and number of employees have increased
significantly.
Integrated financial service giants are rapidly emerging. Driven
by the need for greater scope and more capital, many of the smaller,
pure play investment banks have merged with commercial banks over
the past year.2 45 Independent investment banks like J.P. Morgan and
PaineWebber have been acquired by banks seeking to offer their
corporate clients all services-debt, underwriting, mergers and
acquisitions advice, and corporate lending.246 Every firm needs to
offer clients one-stop shopping, or be frozen out of big underwriting
deals.2 47
244. Syndication also permitted firms to shift losses across a broader group of firms. If
losses occurred during the existence of the syndicate due to pricing, shifts in interest rates,
or other factors, the syndicate bore them. In a large syndicate, these losses were
distributed so that no individual investment bank would be harmed too badly. BIALKIN &
GRANT, supra note 240, at 277.
245. Smith & Gasparino, supra note 29.
246. Steve Lipin et al., Blending Legends, WALL ST. J., Sept. 13, 2000, at Al. Similar
trends can be seen among independent mergers and acquisitions advisory firms. For
example, Wasserstein Perella merged with Dresdner Bank. Erik Portanger & Randall
Smith, Dresdner Bank in Talks to Buy Wasserstein Perella, WALL ST. J., Sept. 12, 2000, at
C1.
247. Lipin, supra note 72 (noting that J.P. Morgan had this problem in competing for
large undenvriting deals).
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TABLE 8: Growth of Major Investment Banks in the 1990s
1990
1998
1990
1998
1993
1997

.P. Morgan

Merrill Lynch
Morgan Stanley Dean
Witter

1990
1997
1990
1997

Annual Sales
(millions of dollars)
$607
2,004
2,386
7,980
14,848
20,433
N/A
17,701
8,750
16,883

Number of
Employees
6,694
12,967
5,732
9,200
8,103
11,000
12,968
16,943
N/A
8,340

1990
1997

11,213
31,731

39,000
56,600

1990
1997
1990
1997

4,506
27,132
2,978
6,657

N/A
47,277
12,700
16,600

Source: HOOVER'S HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN BUSINESS (1999)

This point is well illustrated by the recent IPO of Agere Systems

Inc. Lucent Technologies, which had been beset by financial
problems, decided to spin off Agere Systems Inc. through an IPO,
and assembled a strong team of underwriting firms to manage the
sale.248 The price for participation in the underwriting syndicate,
though, was steep: only firms willing to lend the company between
$100 million and $1 billion dollars were offered manager or comanager roles. 249 Traditional investment banking firms, such as
Goldman Sachs and others, were unwilling to put their balance sheets
at risk to this degree.20 By contrast, commercial banks with
investment banking subsidiaries welcomed the opportunity to use
their lending operations, which are low-margin operations, to displace
other competitors and capture some of the high margin underwriting

248. Suzanne McGee, Lucent Rewarded Lenders with UnderwriterRoles, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 28, 2001, at Cl.
249. Id.Among the commercial bank-owned investment banks underwriting the deal
were Citigroup/Salomon Smith Barney, J.P. Morgan Chase, and D.B. Alex Brown. Id.
250. Randall Smith & Suzanne McGee, Bank's Lending Clout Stings Securities Firms,
WALL ST. J., June 15, 2001, at C1. Traditional investment banking firms, such as Goldman
Sachs Group and Merrill Lynch & Co., have been unable to participate in large, recent
IPO's because they will not offer low-interest loans to issuers. Id. By contrast,
commercial banks that are willing to make these loans to firms have garnered the lion's
share of those company's underwriting business. Commercial banks claim they are
offering clients "one-stop shopping." Id.
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business. 1 One-stop shopping is a powerful force shaping the future
of the underwriting business.
At the same time, the size of underwriting syndicates has
dramatically declined. 2 The continued increase in the size of
securities offerings and other investment banking jobs, such as
mergers and acquisitions, has shifted the probability distribution for
jobs for these firms. As investment banks expect more and larger
jobs to become available, firms have decided that they must expand
internally, or through mergers, in order to capture more of these large
jobs. As table 8 shows, firms across the industry have been growing
rapidly over the past decade.
The shift in client demand and the probability distribution for
jobs is the result of several factors, including the globalization of the
capital and product markets. The strong economic conditions over
the last ten years, particularly in the United States and Europe, have
made investment banks more confident that new and successful issues
will continue to be brought to the market. This supports our claim
that the probability distribution for jobs has shifted toward larger and
more frequent jobs. Internal expansion makes sense when firms are
confident that the new resources they are hiring will be employed

fully.
Today, the investment banking industry, especially those firms
owned by commercial banks, has consolidated to the point where
these firms now dwarf most of their clients. As investment banking
firms have grown in their capital base and the number and variety of
distribution channels that they control, they have obtained access to
most, if not all, major market areas. 53 They no longer need as many
other securities firms to distribute securities in an underwriting P
Thus, internal firm growth has contributed to a decline in the size and
251. McGee, supra note 248 ("[C]ommercial banks that have acquired Wall Street
investment banks try to use their lending operations, once considered a low profit-margin
business for the risks involved, as a way to win higher-margin deals of all kinds, such as
underwriting. That, industry participants say, is a logical step for banks promoting a 'onestop shopping' concept.").
252. Brian Garrity & Chris O'Leary, Relentless Forces Erode Fee Structure:
Megamergers and Hyper-Competition Are Slowly Eroding Underwriting Fees,
INVESTMENT DEALERS' DIG., Feb. 1,1999, at 18-23.

253. BIALKIN & GRANT, supra note 240, at 278.
254. Sung C. Bae et al., Determinants of Underwriter Participationin Initial Public
Offerings of Common Stock: An Empirical Study, 26 J. Bus. FIN. & Accr. 595 (1999)
(finding that a larger capital base for the lead underwriter leads to smaller offering
syndicate size; if the lead underwriter has a greater number of offices, this reduces the
need for a large syndicate; and the greater the prestige of the lead underwriter, the smaller
the syndicate).
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use of syndicates in securities offerings. As a result, in recent years
the size of underwriting syndicates has declined from as many as fifty
firms to between ten and twenty firms for large securities offerings. 5
In fact, some deals are forgoing the syndication process altogetherY6
Changes in legal rules have also influenced the use of syndicates
in securities underwriting. In 1982, the SEC introduced shelf
registration for securities offerings via Rule 415.11 This process
allows companies to sell securities under a two-year blanket
registration."8 Before this new rule, companies had to precede each
security issue with a lengthy registration process. After the adoption
of shelf registration, companies can hire an investment bank to
distribute the securities a few days before the issue goes to market0 9
Empirical research demonstrates that Rule 415 has accelerated
the decline in syndicate size for debt offerings.260 Professor Foster's
study establishes that syndicates in public debt offerings were
significantly smaller after Rule 415 than before. He interprets his
findings as "evidence in support of the notion that the investment
bankers have market power.... Alternatively, the fewer syndicate
members may simply reflect the fact that the time restrictions with a
shelf-registered issue make larger syndicates more expensive. "261
Foster's second explanation-that Rule 415 increased the
relative cost of syndication-is consistent with our theory. Under
Rule 415, speed in doing deals became a predominant concern.
Working with outside groups through syndication is time consuming.
It will, for example, slow down the due diligence process. The higher
relative costs of syndication will yield less syndication activity. In our
model, this effect will cause some firms to grow internally to handle
the large deals. These firms become less eager to syndicate, and the
ripple effects cause other firms to expand.
To summarize our conclusions in this part, the use of syndication
in securities offerings has varied over time, depending on shifts in
255. Garrity & O'Leary, supra note 252, at 18-23.
256. Brian Garrity, Syndicate Members Receive a Sobering View of the Future,
INVESTMENT DEALERS' DIG., Jan. 25, 1999, at 18.
257. See Randall S. Thomas & James F. Cotter, MeasuringSecurities Market Efficiency
in the Regulatory Setting, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 105, 106 (2000) (providing a
general discussion of Rule 415 and shelf registration).
258. COX ET AL., supra note 239, at 306.
259. Id. at 307.
260. See F. Douglas Foster, Syndicate Size, Spreads, and Market Power During the
Introduction of Shelf Registration, 44 J.FIN. 195 (1989) (providing an empirical study of
the effects of Rule 415 on syndicate size in investment banking).
261. Id. at202.
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probability distribution for jobs within the industry as clients'
demands and the size of the firms within the industry have changed.
In addition, legal rules have influenced the relative costs of
syndication versus megafirm underwriting. In recent years, as the
relative costs of syndication have increased, and the importance of
offering one stop shopping has grown, we have seen a decrease in the
size of underwriting syndicates.
V. SECURITIES FRAUD LITIGATION AND SYNDICATION

The prosecution of securities fraud class actions provides another
interesting example of how changes in legal rules can affect firm size
and syndication. What is interesting and distinct about the securities
industry, though, is that demand is not driven by clients, but rather by
judges. Thus, we need to examine the factors that lead judges to
"demand" legal services from plaintiffs' securities law firms. In
particular, we highlight the impact of the 1995 Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act2 62 and the judicial introduction of auctions of
the role of class counsel. Both developments should shift the
probability distribution of jobs in this industry toward larger jobs.
Our general model predicts that at least one firm should grow to
capture more jobs. Indeed, this is the case with Milberg Weiss
Bershad Hynes & Lerach (Milberg Weiss).263 Given the recent nature
of these changes, however, questions remain about how other firms in
this industry will react to the first firm's growth.
Securities fraud class actions arise in a wide variety of settings,
but perhaps most commonly they are filed after a corporation
announces unexpected bad news or insider trading, and the
company's stock price falls dramatically.2 64 Many attorneys file
similar suits on the same set of facts against the same set of
defendants. These suits will later be consolidated by the court. Each
262. In 1995, Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act ("PSLRA"
or the "Reform Act") to try to curb some perceived abuses in the prosecution of securities
fraud class actions. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67,
109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); Randall S. Thomas &
Kenneth J. Martin, Using State Inspection Statutes for Discovery in Federal Securities
Fraud Actions, 77 B.U. L. REV. 69, 70 (1997). The Reform Act contained several
important provisions that affected the prosecution of securities fraud cases, and more
importantly for our purposes, the allocation of work among the members of the syndicate
of plaintiffs' law firms. Thomas & Martin, supra, at 70.
263. See infra note 271 and accompanying text.
264. COX ET AL., supra note 239, at 718-19. There is some evidence that accounting
issues now outnumber other types of alleged fraud in securities class actions. See Business
Bulletin, Accounting Issues Take the Lead in Securities FraudClass Action Suits, WALL ST.
J., July 27, 2000, at Al (summarizing the results of a PricewaterhouseCoopers study).

2001]

MEGAFIRMS

187

lawyer filing an action stakes a claim to be given responsibility for the
consolidated action. To avoid duplicate efforts, the court will select a
single law firm to be "lead counsel" after hearing from all of the
plaintiffs' attorneys about who should have this plum job and how to
divide up the rest of the work among the remaining law firms 65
Normally, plaintiffs' counsel will voluntarily agree amongst
themselves about allocating the tasks. This leads to the formation of
an "ad hoc firm" through informal negotiations among plaintiffs'
counsel,266 which the court legitimizes after an independent
evaluation.2 67
Lead counsel is a highly desirable position because this firm
receives the largest share of any fees generated in the case and has
the most power to control the case. Judges select lead counsel based
on several criteria, including the qualifications and skill of counsel, as
well as their proposed fee agreement.2" The courts' objective is to
ensure fair and adequate representation of the class and preserve the
economy and efficiency of the proceedings. 2 69 A judge generally will
not appoint joint or a committee of lead counsel unless it is necessary
to ensure adequacy of representation.2 70 The key point for our
265. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (THIRD), § 20.22, § 20.224, at 30
[hereinafter LITIGATION MANUAL]. "The court's responsibilities are heightened in class
action, where the judge must approve counsel for the class." See Charles Silver,
Comparing Class Actions and Consolidates, 10 REV. LITIG. 495, 503 (1991) ("The
institutional structure of the class action is governed by law.").
266. See In re Agent Orange, 611 F. Supp. 1452, 1458-59 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), for a use of
the term "ad hoc law firm." In that well-known case, the first group of plaintiffs' attorneys
ran out of funds. A new group of attorneys assumed control of the steering committee in
return for their funding the case, and the two groups agreed to share fees. A dispute on
the fees arose. The first group tried to invalidate the agreement based on the ethical rule
barring fee splitting. The court sidestepped the ethical rule by finding that the plaintiffs'
attorneys had formed an "ad hoc law firm." Id.
267. See LITIGATION MANUAL, supra note 265, § 20.22, at 26, 31 (stating that the court
should conduct independent review; "The court's responsibilities are heightened in class
action litigation, where the judge must approve counsel for the class.").
268. Id. § 20.224.
269. Id. at 30 ("The court should also ensure that designated counsel fairly represent
the various interests in litigation; where diverse interests exist among the parties, the court
may designate a committee of counsel representing different interests."); see also id.
§ 30.16, at 221 ("[I]f necessary to ensure adequacy of representation, the court may
appoint different attorneys as class counsel.... An important element in the selection
process is economy."); 7B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRAC'rICE AND PROCEDURE § 1792, at 294 (2d. 1986) ("[T]he particular type of order a
court will issue under Rule 23(d)(1) may depend on the nature of the dispute and the
litigants as well as the experience of the federal courts in comparable cases.").
270. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 269, § 1792, at 292 ("[C]ourts are often hesitant to
burden the class with the additional fees and the added confusion that may result from
multiple lead attorneys.").
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analysis is that judges determine which firm gets selected to become
lead counsel, and thereby determine a large part of the demand for
legal services.
A second important feature of this industry is that plaintiffs'
securities law firms differ in important ways from the corporate law
megafirms discussed earlier (who often defend securities fraud cases).
The most obvious difference is how small they are. Traditionally, as
shown in table 9, plaintiffs' law firms in these cases have a handful of
partners. In recent years, however, one firm in the plaintiffs'
securities bar, Milberg Weiss, has grown rapidly and become a
diversified, relatively large law firm. This change is reflected in table
9. Indeed, since the passage of the Reform Act in 1995, Milberg
Weiss has seen a substantial increase in the percentage of securities
fraud class actions where it has been designated as lead counsel.2 1
Third, the difference in the relationship between clients and the
law firm in this industry is critical.2 7 2 Clients do not usually control
the litigation of these cases. In fact, law firms themselves often select
the clients in order to have someone to act as the plaintiff in a suit. 273
In other words, these law firms are not often concerned about client
demand. Their clients are usually only interested in litigating one
case, or at most a few cases, and do not offer the firms repeat
business. This is especially true after the passage of PSLRA's
restrictions on professional plaintiffs. Rather, as we discussed above,
the firms are reacting to the demand by judges in seeking to obtain
the lead counsel position for these cases.
Finally, syndication is the norm in this industry. When judges
appoint lead counsel, they routinely approve the creation of a
syndicate of other law firms to help handle the case. It is difficult, if
not impossible, for any one firm to exclude all of its competitors from
the syndicate.
271. See William S. Lerach, "The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995-27
Months Later:" Securities Class Action Litigation Under the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act's Brave New World, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 597, 606 (1998) (stating that prior to
the passage of the Reform Act, Milberg Weiss appeared in approximately thirty-one
percent of securities fraud class actions, whereas after the Act's enactment this increased
to fifty-nine percent).
272. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role
in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for
Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1991) (noting that "the single most salient characteristic of
class and derivative litigation is the existence of 'entrepreneurial plaintiffs' attorneys ....
[which] are not subject to monitoring by their putative clients, [and] operate largely
according to their own self-interest.., and their own sense of ethics and fiduciary
responsibilities").
273. Id. at 66.
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TABLE 9: Growth of Plaintiffs' Securities Fraud Litigation Firms*
Firm Name
Firm Nae

Size in
1990

Size in
1995

Berger & Montague

33

53

48

Office in Philadelphia, PA

Bernstein Litowitz
Berger & Grossmann

11

11

24

Offices in San Diego, Hackensack, and New York City.
Hackensack and San Diego offices added after 1995.

Chimicles &Tikellis

27

22

14

Offices in Wilmington and Haverford. Eliminated Los
Angeles office after 1995.

Goodkind Labaton
Rudoff & Sucharow

26

40

45

Offices in Ft. Lauderdale and New York City. Ft.
Lauderdale office added after 1995.

Lowey Dannenberg
Bemporad & Selinger

12

12

16

60

88

126

Offices in New York City and White Plains. White
Plains office added after 1995.
Offices in Los Angeles, San Diego, San Francisco, New
York City, Boca Raton, FL Firm added San Francisco,
Los Angeles, New York, and Boca Raton offices after
1990.

NIA

4

4

Milberg Weiss
Berhad Hynes &
Lerach
Savett Frutkin Podell
& Ryan

Size inOteInomin
2000

Other Information

Established in 1991. Office in Philadelphia.

*Note: Size includes partners, associates, and of counsel in all offices
Source: MARTINDAtE-HUBBELtLAW DRECrORY (2001).

The next two parts illustrate how the Reform Act and auctions of
the lead counsel position have affected, or could affect, this industry's
structure.
A.

SecuritiesFraudLitigationand the Lead PlaintiffProvision

Congress enacted the Reform Act in 1995 to deter
entrepreneurial plaintiffs' law firms from filing frivolous securities
fraud cases.274 The statute contains several provisions which make it
more difficult, expensive, and risky for law firms to pursue these
cases. These provisions have both demand-side and supply-side
effects. Most important for our demand-side focus is the Reform
Act's lead plaintiff provision.27 5 Congress created a presumption that
the firm representing the shareholders with the largest financial
interest should be designated lead counsel for the class.276 The
provision was intended to create real clients for these lawsuits, and in

274. See, e.g., Thomas & Martin, supra note 262, for a general discussion of the Reform
Act's provisions.
275. 1& at 77-78.
276. See 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(a)(3)(B) (Supp. V 1999).
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particular to attract institutional investors as the lead plaintiffs. 277 In
fact, institutional investors have been extremely reluctant to get
involved in this type of litigation for a variety of reasons.2 78
Instead, the statute has become a case allocation mechanism with
significant consequences for the plaintiffs' securities bar. The lead
plaintiff provision has shifted the structure of the law firm syndicate
litigating these cases by giving the winning firm the position of lead
counsel and a larger share of the work generated in the case, while
leaving other firms with a reduced role in the syndicate. It has caused
plaintiffs' law firms to compete vigorously to attract the largest
shareholders as clients. While the federal courts have split over how
to determine the number of shares represented by a firm,279 under any

277. Elliott J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How
InstitutionalInvestors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities ClassActions, 104 YALE L.J.
2053,2105-06 (1995).
278. Commenting on the lead plaintiff provision of the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995, some scholars have noted that it may prove to be an obstacle to
certain actions:
The lead plaintiff provision was intended by Congress to be a means by which
shareholders could be put in charge of securities class actions. In practice,
however, the lead plaintiff provision could become another obstacle to federal
securities class actions. Extended disputes over lead plaintiff status, while
creating delay and expense, produce little tangible benefit for the class. In this
regard, we note that the Reform Act does not include lead plaintiff motion
papers among the pleadings and papers that are subjected to mandatory Rule 11,
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, scrutiny. Absent a meaningful threat of
sanctions for meritless objections to lead plaintiff status, plaintiffs and their
lawyers have every reason to tie institutional investors up in lead plaintiff battles.
Worse yet, if other courts follow the Cephalon court's lead in allowing wideranging discovery without any showing of a reasonable basis that the institution
can not adequately represent the class, institutions could be discouraged from
intervening in securities class actions as Congress intended. The legislative
history suggests that Congress believed institutions would readily step forward
once they were armed with the new lead plaintiff provision. Our discussions with
institutional investors, however, suggest that there are substantial disincentives
for institutional investors considering intervention in securities class actions.
Those disincentives fall into two categories: cost and exposure. As the Reform
Act allows plaintiffs to conduct discovery of other plaintiffs, institutions may find
key personnel being subjected to costly and time-consuming discovery by
plaintiffs and then to a second round of discovery by defendants. Moreover,
private institutional investors, such as investment companies, may be forced to
open their books during discovery revealing proprietary information. In
addition, many institutions may not want to advance the costs of litigation for the
class. Adding to the expense is the time needed to manage the litigation.
Richard H. Walker et al., The New Securities Class Action: Federal Obstacles, State
Detours, 39 ARIz. L. REv. 641,664-65 (1997).
279. See Jill E. Fisch, Aggregation,Auctions, and Other Developments in the Selection
of Lead Counsel Under the PSLRA, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 65-78 (2001); Jill E.
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interpretation, the provision creates strong incentives for plaintiffs'
law firms to try to attract clients with big blocks of stockholdings.
Firms have responded to these new rules by racing to publish their
role in these cases to attract clients. 280
In our model's terminology, the firm with the most client
demand (most shares represented) gets the biggest piece of the job.
To the extent that judges strictly enforce its requirements, it removes
some of their discretion in determining which firm is lead counsel and
makes client demand more important. Moreover, if bigger firms can
attract bigger clients, they will have an advantage in getting the lead
counsel position.
This provision also affects the terms of the negotiation between
the plaintiffs' law firms over the allocation of work within the
syndicates that handle these cases. If one firm, say Milberg Weiss,
most frequently captures the lead counsel positions in these cases,
then when other firms become lead counsel they have an incentive to
give Milberg Weiss preferential treatment to curry favor with this
dominant player.
Thus, if one firm wins most lead counsel
assignments, it will also get a bigger share of the work in syndicates
where it is not lead counsel. As a result of these dynamics, the
Reform Act may create incentives for plaintiffs' securities fraud law
firms to become bigger if firm growth leads them to attract larger
clients and garner more lead counsel assignments.
The lead plaintiff provision has another important effect: early
work in a case may not be rewarded. Even if a law firm finds and
develops a strong case and files a well-drafted complaint, it may still
wind up without a role in the litigation if another firm shows up with a
client that has a larger stake in the company being sued. Losing law
firms therefore face higher sunk costs than prior to the Reform Act.
This is an important supply-side factor affecting firm structure.
In addition to the lead plaintiff provision, the Reform Act has
other features that raise the cost of prosecuting these cases and
increase the litigation risks. First, the statute raises the pleading
standard for securities fraud suits brought under the 1934 Exchange

Fisch, Class Action Reform: Lessons from Securities Litigation,39 ARIz. L. REv. 533, 549
(1997).
280. One example of this competition is the increased use of firm web sites as a method
of attracting potential shareholders. Milberg Weiss's web site is the best example of how
firms compete in this regard. See generally MILBERG WEISS BERSHAD & LERACH LLP,
Representing Consumers and Investors in Class Actions, at http://www.milberg.com (last
visited Nov. 15,2001) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
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Act."8 To achieve its objective, Congress declared that a federal
securities fraud complaint must: (1) specify each statement alleged to
have been misleading and the reasons why the statement is
misleading; and (2) if an allegation is made on information and belief,
state with particularity all facts upon which that belief is formed.2 2
Furthermore, the complaint must state with particularity facts giving
rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the requisite
scienter, or intent to defraud, with respect to each alleged wrongful
act or omission.283 This latter requirement codifies a state of mind
standard of pleading that is based on the Second Circuit's decisions, a
standard that is generally regarded as the most stringent pleading
requirement among the federal circuits.2 4 This means that firms need
to invest substantially more resources and manpower in investigating
each case thus raising the cost of filing a case. From an economic
perspective, this change leads to higher sunk costs because of the
need to investigate the case and spend money on accountants and
investigative agents.
Second, PSLRA stays discovery until after the resolution of the
defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint. 2 5 This increases the
likelihood that a case will be dismissed, wasting the resources already
invested. One commentator has reported that the plaintiffs' law firms
are losing about fifty percent of the motions to dismiss in securities
fraud cases. 2' 6 The numbers are much more one-sided in Silicon
Valley with the federal courts granting virtually all motions for
dismissal.2
Third, the statute restricts the use of "professional plaintiffs,"
that is, law firm clients who act as the named plaintiff in many suits
281. In deciding to enact PSLRA, Congress made clear that it believed that the Federal
Rules' of Civil Procedure generous pleading requirement failed to deter private litigants
from abusing the federal securities laws. See Thomas & Martin, supra note 262, at 75.
Congress determined that a uniform and more stringent pleading requirement was needed
to curtail the filing of meritless lawsuits. Id.
282. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1) (Supp. V 1999).
283. Id. § 78u-4(b)(2).
284. Thomas & Martin, supra note 262, at 75.
285. PSLRA requires that all discovery be stayed during the pendency of a motion to
dismiss a securities fraud complaint brought under the 1933 Securities Act or the 1934
Exchange Act. 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(b)(1)-(4) (Supp. V 1999). The sole exception is where
the court finds that the discovery is needed to preserve evidence or to prevent undue
prejudice to a party. Id. § 77z-1(b)(2). For defendants that succeed in getting the action
dismissed, this change will greatly reduce the costs of defending the lawsuit. For plaintiffs,
however, it means that in most cases they must seek evidence of fraud without the
assistance of the court. Thomas & Martin, supra note 262, at 76.
286. Lerach, supra note 271, at 615.
287. Id.
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each year
This makes it necessary for a plaintiffs' law firm to have
a larger client base so that they can find people to act as the nominal
plaintiff in the cases they file.
Fourth, PSLRA raises the stakes if the court chooses to impose

sanctions against plaintiffs and their counsel for violations of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 11.28 The Reform Act adopts a limited form
of the English rule on fee shifting, thereby making the plaintiffs liable
for the defendants' costs and attorneys fees if they are sanctioned by
the court.2 0 The threat of sanctions puts firms' capital at risk if they
file a suit that a court finds frivolous.

Each of these provisions reduces the incentives that plaintiffs'
law firms have to undertake securities fraud cases, especially weaker
cases. Taken as a whole, the Reform Act increases the cost of

researching and prosecuting any securities fraud complaint 2 91 and it
raises the risk that the law firm will receive nothing for its efforts.

The Reform Act may also increase law firm capital needs, and make
it more important to have a diversified portfolio in order to spread

the risks. Higher costs and greater risk can have the effect of leading
weaker firms to exit the industry, leaving the remaining firms with a
larger market share.2 2 These supply-side factors are important
288. PSLRA contains a number of provisions designed to stop the use of professional
plaintiffs, including requirements that: (1) each named plaintiff in the action certify, inter
alia, that they did not purchase the security at the request of their attorney to participate
in the lawsuit; (2) notice of the pendency of the action be published in a national business
publication or wire service; (3) bounty payments or other bonuses to named plaintiffs are
prohibited; and (4) discourage courts from allowing a person to be a lead plaintiff in more
than five securities fraud cases during any three year period. 15 U.S.C. § 77z-l(a)(2)(A)
(Supp. V 1999).
289. PSLRA requires courts to make specific findings concerning each party's and
attorney's compliance with Rule l's requirements. 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(c)(1) (Supp. V
1999). If the court finds that there has been a violation of Rule 11, it is required to impose
sanctions with reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses presumed to be the appropriate
sanction. Id. § 77z-1(c)(2). If the complaint "substantially fails" to comply with Rule 11,
the amount of this award is unlimited. Id. § 77z-1(c)(3)(A)(ii).
290. Thomas & Martin, supra note 262, at 78.
291. We recognize that there are numerous other provisions of PSLRA that reduce the
attractiveness of bringing these cases, including safe harbor provisions for forward-looking
statements, limitations on recoverable damages, changes to defendants' proportionate
liability and settlement rights, and exclusion from the RICO statute of securities fraud as a
predicate act, and revised auditor reporting obligations. For further discussion of these
provisions, see John W. Avery, Securities Litigation Reform: The Long and Winding Road
to the PrivateSecuritiesLitigation Reform Act of 1995, 51 Bus. LAW. 335 (1996).
292. Lerach attributes Milberg Weiss's success to its ability to best address these
changes: it is the best capitalized plaintiffs' firm and can therefore withstand the costs and
delays associated with the Reform Act; it has the most diversified portfolio of plaintiffs'
claims and can therefore absorb the greater risks associated with litigating cases under the
Reform Act; and that it is best situated "to internalize the externalities associated with the
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determinants of firm structure.
The limited empirical evidence that we have been able to muster
suggests that PSLRA has significantly affected firm structure in the
plaintiffs' securities fraud bar. As table 9 reveals, Milberg Weiss has
grown much more than the other firms in the area. The most salient
fact is the significant increase in the number of cases where Milberg
Weiss is designated as lead counsel. Bill Lerach estimates that his law
firm appears in about sixty percent of the securities fraud class actions
filed since the passage of the Reform Act.293 In a small data set that
we gathered for post-Reform Act cases, we found that this firm was
named lead counsel in forty-one of sixty-three cases (about sixty-five
percent) where we could determine who was appointed lead counsel.
Milberg Weiss's success in obtaining the role of lead counsel has been
accompanied by significant growth in the size of this law firm. z94 In
other words, Milberg Weiss has been able to capture a larger share of
the bigger jobs and appears to have expanded its firm so that it can
handle this work internally.
Our model predicts that other firms should react to Milberg
Weiss's growth if this growth allows it to capture more clients and to
reduce the remaining firms' opportunities to get the lead counsel
position. Yet, no other firm in this industry that we are aware of has
grown as rapidly as Milberg Weiss. While at first this seems puzzling,
we believe that there are several reasons why the expected growth
may not yet have occurred. First, the passage of the Reform Act is
still fairly recent so that firms may still be in the process of reacting to
its effects. Second, the main driving force for law firm growth in this
industry would be to capture more lead counsel assignments by taking
advantage of the lead plaintiff provision's presumption that the class
member with the largest financial interest should be able to direct the
litigation. Firms may be able to attract these clients through other
techniques without increasing their size, such as generating a
reputation for quality outcomes or appealing to certain types of
investors. In other words, boutique firms may not suffer from being
small in this competition with a larger firm to attract clients. Finally,
small size firms may find non-economic factors, such as collegiality
and firm culture, particularly important. These may lead the other
plaintiffs' law firms to reject the growth paradigm and prefer to
remain boutique firms. They do not need to fear a complete loss of
need to invest to create new precedent interpreting the [new law]." Lerach, supra note
271, at 606.
293. Id.
294. See table 9 for evidence of such growth.
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business as long as judges continue to routinely approve syndication

of these cases. We conclude that there may be good reasons why the
other firms in the plaintiffs' securities bar have not reacted to Milberg
Weiss's growth by engaging in their own internal expansion.
B.

Auctions of Lawsuits
295 in 1990,
Beginning with In re Oracle Securities Litigation

several courts have auctioned the role of lead counsel in securities
fraud class actions among competing law firms.2 96

In the Oracle

litigation, Judge Walker instructed the law firms that were competing
for the position of lead counsel for the stockholder class to submit

sealed litigation budgets, including reimbursable litigation expenses
and the percentage of the judgment that counsel would require to
take the case. 297 A well-qualified firm offered to handle the case for

the lowest fee, and Judge Walker awarded them the job of litigating
the lawsuit. 2 9 s

While in subsequent auctions the terms have varied somewhat
from case to case, they generally result in single firms winning the bid

and handling the case. Thus, the most interesting consequence of
auctions from our perspective is that auctions may cause judges to
award one firm the entire suit, and thus may eliminate the syndication
295. In re Oracle Securities Litigation, 131 F.R.D. 688 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
296. For further discussion of the pros and cons of auctions of lawsuits, see Randall S.
Thomas & Robert G. Hansen, Auctioning Class Action and Derivative Lawsuits: A
Critical Analysis, 87 NW. U. L. REv. 423 (1993). There is an extensive literature
concerning the merits of auctions of the lead counsel position in lawsuits. For a thorough
review of this literature, see Jill E. Fisch, Lawyers on the Auction Block-- Evaluating the
Selection of Class Counsel by Auction 102 COLUM. L. REXV. (forthcoming Apr. 2002)
(concluding that auctions should be abandoned and replaced with negotiations with
"empowered" lead plaintiffs).
297. See In re Oracle, 131 F.R.D. at 690-91. The principal advantage of Judge Walker's
proposal for auctioning the lead counsel position is that it increases the winning attorney's
incentives to invest in case preparation because she will not have to share the expected
profit of prosecuting the action with other attorneys. John C. Coffee, Jr. The Unfaithful
Champion: The Plaintiffas Monitor in Shareholder Litigation, 48 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 5 (1985). However, this procedure has serious drawbacks. For example, if the
court awards the case to the lowest cost attorney, the unintended consequence may be that
the least competent counsel, who had the lowest costs, wins the bid. To the extent that
lawyers' fees reflect their demand by the market, it seems an undesirable consequence of
this method that it could allocate these cases to the worst attorneys. Id at 61-65.
Furthermore, as Macey and Miller note, this technique reintroduces significant agency
costs because the winning attorney will have incentives to settle early to obtain a larger
profit on the fee. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role
in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for
Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 113 (1991); see also Coffee, supra, at 77-78.
298. In re Oracle,132 F.R.D. 538,546-47 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
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of lawsuits among various law firms. Auction winners will tend to get
more business, while other firms will get less. How will firms react to
such a regime if it is adopted on a routine basis?
In our terminology, the nature of judicial demand for law firm
services would have changed. Judicial auctions shift the probability
distribution of jobs towards larger projects, as the judge allows (or
perhaps prefers) the winning bidder to handle the entire case. Each
individual job will be bigger for the winning firm because it can staff
the entire case itself without being forced to share the work with firms
representing other plaintiffs. Our model predicts that this should
create incentives for firms to get bigger, as the Milberg Weiss firm has
already done.
Judicial auctions could allow bids from a consortium of firms. If
this were allowed, syndication would still be possible. Whether these
syndicates could outbid single firms in auctions is impossible to
predict. In a competitive market, the equilibrium outcome will
depend on how the single firm's internal costs of expansion compare
with the syndication costs incurred by the consortiums of smaller
firms. The key point is that the auction model could allow the market
to make the choice between syndication and megafirm, whereas the
prior legal regime required syndication.
Our model offers one important insight into how competition
between smaller and larger firms would play out in a world of
auctions. If the same economics apply to plaintiffs' law firms that we
discussed in Part II for larger diversified law firms, then we might
anticipate that the larger firms will win out over the syndicate of
smaller firms once the traditional legal rule that led to syndication is
removed. This is certainly what happened in many other legal
markets.
The one caveat to this prediction is that pure play firms continue
to serve an important role in certain specialty legal practices.
Securities fraud litigation may be one of those areas. If small firms
can win auctions based on a reputation for producing quality results
for the class, they may be able to compete with the bigger firms.
However, to the extent that they need larger amounts of capital to
compete effectively, perhaps because of the passage of the Reform
Act and its provisions, smaller firms face a significant competitive
disadvantage. Thus, legal reforms could inadvertently create larger
plaintiffs' law firms.
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CONCLUSIONS

Firm structure in the project industries we study-law,
accounting, and investment banking-responds to both demand-side
and supply-side factors. While many scholars have identified
important supply-side determinants, little attention has been paid to
the demand-side.
Our model addresses that oversight. In these project-oriented
industries, a key determinant of firm size is the size distribution of
projects demanded by clients. No firm will find it profitable to be as
large as necessary to internally service the largest projects if these
projects come too infrequently to justify the fixed costs of internal
expansion. Rather, firms will choose their size recognizing that
syndication with other firms is a viable alternative way of servicing
these projects. In determining its size at any point in time, a firm
must balance the internal costs of expansion against the external costs
of syndication. In addition, legal constraints against combining
practices can limit the growth of firms.
Megafirms arise as the demand distribution of projects shifts
towards larger projects. All the industries examined here-law,
accounting, and investment banking-have seen this shift in demand.
Global corporations demand global projects from their lawyers,
accountants, and investment bankers. Many clients are willing to pay
for one-stop shopping. Supply-side factors, such as improvements in
technology, may lower costs and encourage firm growth also. As a
result, megafirms have appeared in each industry. Further, this client
demand for larger, multidisciplinary projects is putting pressure on
ethical restrictions against servicing them with a single,
multidisciplinary firm.
Megafirms have their limits. They may be approaching their
limits in the accounting industry. Most of the Big Five firms are
facing enormous internal costs (as well as outside regulatory
pressure) in holding their accounting and consulting parts together.
Some form of syndication of accounting and consulting services (or
sharing between separate entities) may end up being the equilibrium
form of organization in these industries. By contrast, law firms do not
yet appear to have reached a point where increased internal costs
outweigh the benefits of future expansion. We would expect to see
more consolidation in that industry in the years to come.
Legal rules also shape megafirms. Some legal rules hinder
megafirms and lead to syndication as an alternative. The ABA's
ethical rules against lawyers mingling with others have clearly

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80

inhibited the growth of multidisciplinary law-accounting firms in this
country. MDPs are more advanced in Europe, where the regulations
are more lax. The SEC's rules on accounting independence similarly
hamper the Big Five megafirms, possibly causing several of them to
separate their auditing and consulting practices.
Other legal rules bolster megafirms. We saw this most clearly in
the investment banking and securities fraud litigation examples. Shelf
registration under Rule 415 has spurred the growth of investment
banking megafirms and the decline of underwriting syndicates. The
lead plaintiff provisions in the Reform Act (and potentially auctions
of the lead counsel role in these cases) appear to have helped create a
mega-law firm, and changed the structure of that industry.
Our model is very flexible and offers a wide variety of potential
applications and predictions for firm structure and its effect on legal
rules. We believe that there is much more work to be done in these
areas. In particular, we see a need to empirically test more of the
propositions that we develop in this Article. This is a fruitful area for
further research.

